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Practical arguments (the term originates with Aristotle) are
arguments whose conclusions specify an action to be performed by
an agent and whose premises provide Justification for that
action. In the conversational mode? conclusions of practical
arguments often t3ke the form "Do X"? although "I advise you to
do X"? I recommend X"? "Why not do X?"? "If I were you? I would
do X"? "You should do X"? "I urge you to do X"? and so on? are
also common. Some examples.
I have never seen a stock with so much potential.
Buy as much as you can.
Salaries 3t the American University are high. But Lebanon is
still unsafe.
I wouldn't accept their offer if I were you.
I know superior engineering when I see it.
I recommend the Yugo.
It's cold in here.
Would you close the window?
The roads are icy.
So drive carefully.
Conclusions of practical arguments encompass 3 wide range of
speech acts including advising? recommending? requesting?
warning? instructing? exhorting? and urging. Note that
commanding and ordering are conspicuously absent from the list.
Commands enjoin actions which are expected to be obeyed without
further explanation or Justification.
In the absence of 3 performative verb? e.g. "I advise?
recommend? urge?..."? the il locutionary force of a practical
conclusion is - in a manner to be explained
-
3 function of the
premises. Consider the utterance "Don't go near the stove". Is
this a warning? an order? a reouest or perhaps an instance of
some other speech act category? Apart from context? it is
impossible to tell. Once context is supplied? however? the
Question 311 but answers itself.
1. If you touch the stove? you will burn yourself.
So don't go near the stove.
(warning)
2. When they are convinced that you are not going to feed them?
they will leave.
So don't go near the stove.
(sdvice)
3. It's my turn to cook tonight.
So don't go near the stove.
( reouest )
4. I can't take another one of your casseroles.
If you want to continue living? don't go near the stove.
(threat)
5. If you can control your impulse to cook? I will take you out
to dinner tonight.
So don't go near the stove.
(promise )
6. I'm in charge here.
So don't go near the stove.
(order)
In this thesis? I design 3 program which accepts practicsl
arguments as input? paraphrases them intelligently? and
identifies the principal speech act(s) performed by the speaker.
Speech acts identified are advice? promises? warnings? and
threats. For the most part? input for the program is of the form
If X then Y. So (don't) do
Z."
For example? given the input
If you finish your homework before six then I will let you watch
television. So start right now.
the program responds
S promised to let you watch television if you finish your
homework before six. Starting right now will make it more likely
that you will finish your homework before six.
And given the input
Real estate prices will fall if the college closes. So wait a
year before buying a house in the area.
the program responds
S believes that if the college closes real est3te prices will
fall. With this in mind S has advised you to W3it a year before
buying a house in the area.
In chapter 4? I provide 3n account of the speech acts in
Question? and propose some data structures for the program. There
is also a discussion of heuristics? followed by an outline of the
program. Chapter 5 contains 3 program listing? and chapter 6 some
sample runs.
1.2 INPUT
A fundamental assumption of this thesis is that arguments of
the form "If X then Y. So (don't) do
Z."
comprise a small but
important subset of practicsl arguments? for the reason that many
if not all practical arguments can be recast in this form without
4
loss of meaning or structure. This assumption is based on the
Aristotelian means-end model of practical arguments as
deliberations which "assume the end (viz. a desire need? interest
or goal of the aSent) and consider how and by what means it is to
be
attained."
(Nichomachesn Ethics? 1112bl5--31 ) ? Consider the
following example.
The stove is hot.
So don't touch it.
While readily understandable? this argument is enthymematic
Fleshed out? it becomes
1. The stove is hot.
2. Hot things cause burns when touched.
3. So if you touch the stove? you will burn yourself. (1?2)
4. (But you wish to 3void burning yourself, (agent's assumed
interests) )
5. So don't touch the stove. (3?4)
In the short version? the hearer's interests as well as the
implications of the stove's being hot are so obvious that they
3re not mentioned. Note that in the long version? (1) is not
even 3 premise of the main argument. Its role is to provide
evidence for (3). If? as I suspect? this example is typical?
then the form "If X then Y. So (don't) do
Z"
may well capture
the deep structure of 3 lsrge class of practical arguments 3nd so
is not 3 bsd place to stsrt.
How does one go 3bout reducing prscticsl arguments to the
form "If X then Y. So (don't) do Z"?. To continue the example?
suppose "Hot things cause burns when
touched"
has been stored in
the knowledge bsse. The reduction of "The stove is hot. So don't
touch if can then be carried out as follows.
Algorithm 1
1. Assume that the real premise (RP) of the the argument is of
the form "If X then Y where
X = the negation of the propositional content of the
conclusion
Y = some as yet unspecified harm to H.
RPJ If you touch the stove? <something bad will happen)-
2. Also assume thst the role of the st3ted premise (SP) is to
provide evidence for RP.
3. The conseauent of RP (viz. you will burn yourself) can now be
deduced from SP and the known fact that hot things cause burns
when touched.
Algorithm 1 applies to arguments in which an 3gent is being
urged to do something in order to 3Void an undesirable state of
affairs. A slightly amended version applies to arguments in
which an sgent is being urged to do something in order to bring
sbout 3 desirable state of aff3irs. Consider the following case.
Short Version
The movie is excellent.
So see it.
Long Version
1. The movie is excellent.
2. Excellent things are pleasing to see.
3. So if you see the movie? you will be pleased. (1?2)
4. (You want to be pleased, (agent's assumed desires))
5. So see the movie. (3?4)
Given that "Excellent things are pleasing to
see"
h3s been stored
in the knowledge base? the reduction proceeds as follows.
Algorithm 2
1. Assume that the real premise (RP) is of the form "If X then
Y"
? where
X = the propositional content of the conclusion
Y
~
some as yet unspecified benefit to H.
RP J If you see the movie? <something good will happen)-
2. Also assume that the role of the stated premise (SP) is to
provide evidence for RP.
3. The conseouent of RP (viz. "you will be pleased") can now be
deduced from SP and the known fact that excellent things are
pleasing to see.
Both of these 3lgorithims are implemented in the program to
be found in chapter 5. See speech-act (clause 2) and Sen-prem.
The reader may have noticed that two more variations on the
algorithm are possible. Let us call them algorithms 3 and 4. In
algorithm 3?
X := the negation of the propositional content of the
conclusion
Y ~ some as yet unspecified benefit to H
while in alsorhthm 4?
X := the propositional content of the conclusion
Y = some 3S yet unspecified harm to H.
There is nothing to be sained by implementing either of these
algorithms? since there can be no cases to which they apply. This
follows from 3 purely conceptual point about the nature of
reasons. Consider the following argument schemata.
If you do X then Y.
So do X .
If you do XI then Yl.
So don't do XI.
In the first instance? the fact that doing X will le3d to Y is
cited as a sufficient or decisive reason for you to do X. But
that fact could not possibly count as a sufficient reason for
you to do X unless Y is some desirable state of affairs.
(Algorithm 4 is ruled out.) In the second instance? the fact
that doing XI will lead to Yl is cited as a sufficient reason for
you not to do XI. But that fact could count as a sufficient
reason for not doing XI only if Yl is some undesirable state of
affairs. (Algorithm 3 is ruled out.)
These last considerations form the theoretical basis far
heuristics 1 and 2 of the program to follow. (See 4.3). They also
explain why it is unnecessary to include a statement of the
assent's interests among the premises of practical arguments. That
information is already there implicitly.
1.3 WHY PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS?
Over any significant stretch of discourse? one finds a wide
diversity of speech acts being performed. In many cases? these
acts are embedded in practical arguments. The intent of this
thesis is to develop data structures for rep resent ins promises?
advice? threats and warnings? as well as mechanisms for
recognizing these speech acts in their natural habitat.
But the re i s ano the r Seal. Commun i c at i on between humans and
machines is now possible to a limited extent. We are 3ble to
Query machines for information? order them to perform certain
8
t3sks? 3nd enlsrge their dat3bases by feeding them new facts.
This thesis is? I hope? part of a larger project to extend these
communicative possibilities. Consider the following paradigmatic
example of human communication.
Suppose that A has been given a task to perform 3nd h3s
mapped out a plan for carrying out that task. Suppose further
th3t B? after inspecting the plan? concludes that it is
inefficient or defective in some respect. Assuming that A and B
enJoy 3 cooperative relation? one expects that B would warn A
that the plan is deficient and if possible advise A as to how it
might be improved. At this Juncture? one expects that A would
evaluate the advice and accept or reject it depending on its
perceived merits.
To simulate A's role in this scenario? a machine must be
capsble of
1. constructing plans to achieve goals
2. recognizing and distinguishing speech acts such as advice and
warnings
3. recognizing reasons (premises of practical arguments) given in
support of advice (warnings? etc.)
4. evaluating those reasons
5. accepting or rejecting advice (warnings? etc.) in light of
those evaluations.
The theory of planning is alresdy well understood (Newell
snd Simon (1972)? Fikes snd Nilsson (1971)? Hsyes-Roth (1980))?
and plan construction
programs are now commonplace (e.g. WARPLAN?
Warren? (1974)). This thesis addresses conditions 2 and 3.
Conditions 4 and 5 suggest a natural and exciting extension of
9
the thesis. Note thst success of the l3rger project presupposes




sn argument whose conclusion specifies an action to be
performed and whose premises provide reasons for that
action? e.g.? "The stove is hot. So don't touch
it."
SPEECH ACT
an act of asserting? asking? ordering? assuming?
instructing? advising? warning? etc.
PROPOSITION
the subject-predicate component of a speech 3ct. Different
speech 3cts may have the same propositional content? e.g.?
"S3m smokes"? "Does Sam smoke?"? "Sam? smoke!".
! ? W? A? ?
symbols for imperatives? warnings? assertions and Questions.
! (Z)
the imperative "Do Z!"? where Z is the propositional content
and
"!"
the speech act indicator.
LANGUAGE DRIVEN SYSTEM
3 natural language understanding system which depends
primarily on syntactic? semantic and pragmatic information
to process texts.
DOMAIN DRIVEN SYSTEM
a natural language understanding system which depends




a list of actions which facilitate the occurence of event X
or make X more likely to happen.
X-NEGATIVE LIST
a list of actions which make event X less likely to occur.
BENEFIT LIST
Each benefit list contains (1) a state of affairs SA which
from the speaker's paint af view is in the best interests af
the hearer? and (2) a set of actions and states of affairs
which raise the benefit value of SA.
HARM LIST
Each harm list contains (1) a state of sffsirs SA which from
the speaker's point of view is not in the hearer's best
interests and (2) a set of actions and states of affairs
which lower the harm value of SA.
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2. UNDERSTANDING NATURAL LANGUAGE:
RELATED RESEARCH
2.1 STORY UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMS
2.1.1 INTRODUCTION
Research efforts in this ares have centered an the problem
of designing systems which paraphrase stories and answer simple
Questions about their content. Consider this example? adapted
from Schank and Abelson (1977? pg . 45).
John went to a restaurant. His hamburger was cold when the
waitress brought it to him. He left her a very small tip.
A story understanding system should be able to answer
Questions such as the following.
QJ What did John order at the restaurant?
A J He ordered a hamburger.
QJ Why did he leave the waitress a small tip?
A J Because his hamburger was cold.
Q! Did he enJoy his meal?
At Probably not*
Q. Why da you say thst?
A. Because his hamburger was cold. Besides? he left the
waitress a small tip.
Note that none of these Questions address issues mentioned
explicitly in the text. To answer them? the system must make
reasonable inferences based on commonsense assumptions about how
people may be expected to act in such situations. In this
example? assumptions are that restaurant patrons normally order
food before it is brought to them? th3t most people do not like
cold hamburgers? and that small tips may be an indication of
dissatisfaction with the service.
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The example is by no means atypical. It has become
axiomstic in the field that understanding stories reauires not
only syntactic and semantic competence? but 3 wide-ranging
knowledge of the world and the ability to make inferences based
on that knowledge. Indeed? theories of natural language story
understanding can be categorized by the solutions they provide
to the following problems.
1. What kinds of commonsense (non-linguistic) knowledge are
reauired to understand natural language texts?
2. How is such knowledge to be represented in the system?
3. What inference mechanisms 3re reauired to access that
knowledge?
2.1.2 RIEGER (1975)
In a pioneering effort? Rieger proposed sixteen inference
classes which he believed necessary for understanding natural
language texts. The following examples are discussed by
Wilensky (1978? pS 7).
1. Resultative inference
input J John gave Mary a car.
inference J Mary has 3 car.
2. Motivational inference
input i John hit Mary.
inference: John probably wanted Mary to be hurt.
3. Functional inference
input : John wants 3 book.
inference: John probably wants to read the book.
4. Feature inference
13
input : Andy's diapers are wet.
inference: Andy is probably a baby.
Rieger's program? the MEMORY component of MARGIE (Schank?
Abelson? et al.)? had an inference procedure for every inference
class. An input sentence was inspected by e3Ch procedure and
whenever possible an inference was drawn. Inferences were then
drawn from inferences. The problem was that to
"understand"
a
story? as many as one thousand inferences had to be generated
from each input sentence. Combinatorial explosions were
gu3rsnteed for ana but the simplest texts.
2.1.3 SCHANK AND ABELSON (1977)
In 3n attempt to reduce the volume of inferences generated
by Rieger's program? Cullingford (1978) developed SAM (Script
Applier Mechanism). Here knowledge was represented in the form
not of inference rules but of stereotypical seauences of actions
and events. The theory was that much of the knowledge reauired
to understand stories is of Just this type (Schank and Abelson
1977). Consider the case of John and his cold hamburger in the
light of the following "restaurant
script"
adspted from Schank












Without knowledge of this familiar seauence of restaurant
events? it is difficult to explain how an understander is 3ble
to recognize ana relation between John's entering the
restaurant? being brought a hamburger? and leaving a tip. The
script provides a framework of expectations for the understander
and allows him to organize otherwise unrelated events.
The script as background knowledge also explains how an
understander is able to draw inferences from the story as given?
for example? that John ordered the hamburger before it was
brought to him? that he 3te (or made an attempt to est) the
hamburger? th3t he paid for the hamburger and eventually left
the restaurant. In SAM? such inferences are drawn automatically
by assuming that 311 events listed in the stored script actually
occur? unless there is explicit evidence to the contrary.
Frame b3sed understanding systems such as SAM have proved
effective in understanding highly structured newspaper accounts
of terrorist att3cks? armed robberies? and highway accidents.
It seems unlikely? however? that such systems will ever evolve
into general story understanders . Even if most stories do have
a script-like structure? a doubtful assumption at best? the
number of stored scripts reauired
for such a system is
incalculsble. Existing scripts? becoming ever more bloated?
would lose their stereotyped char3cter 3S the system encountered
unanticipated events forcing script updates. The combinatorial




The concept of 3 frame based system? of which SAM is an
example* originated with Minsk* (1975). For research on frame
based systems? see Kuipers (1975)? Bobrow and WinoSrad (1977)?
Fahlmsn (1975)? Charniak (1978) and Brachman (1978).
2.1.4 WILENSKY (1977)
Wilensky's program PAM? or Plan Applier Mechanism? is an
example of an explanstion driven story understsnder . The
assumption here is that understanding a story largely consists
in understanding why the events and actions of th3t story took
place. PAM explains actions in terms of the
3gents'
goals? the
role of actions in plans to achieve S03IS? 3nd finally the
themes which give rise to goals. Consider the following
examples from Wilensky (1977? pS. 12)
1. John hsted Mary. One day? John saw a truck coming down the
street toward Msry. John ran up behind Mary and gave her a
shove.
2. John loved Mary. One day? John saw a truck coming down the
street toward M3ry. John ran up behind Mary 3nd Ssve her 3
shove.
The most ressonsble account of story 1 is that John pushed
Mary toward the truck. In story 2? it is likely that John
pushed Mary awaa from the truck. As understsnders? how do we
intuitively drsw such conclusions? According to Wilensky? 3nd
it is difficult to argue? such inferences are licensed by
general rules of physical
caus3lity snd human motivation known
to all. In this case?
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a. If X hates Y then X may wsnt to hsrm Y.
b. If X loves Y then X will W3nt to help Y if Y is endangered.
c. If X is hit by a heavy moving object then X will probably be
hurt.
Goals? plans and themes? concepts familiar to readers of
Sch3nk and Abelson (1977)? are cornerstones of Wilensky 's
account of understanding. Briefly? a goal is 3 stste of 3ff3irs
desired by an 3gent? a plan is a method for achieving a goal?
and 3 theme is a state of affairs or attitude which gives rise
to goals. In story 1? hatred of Mary is the theme? harming M3ry
the go3l? 3nd pushing Msry in front of a truck the plan. PAM's
inferencing mechanism is a set of condition-action rules
expressing causal relations between events and psychological
relations anions themes? sosls 3nd plans.
Pam stores plans in script-like data structures called
plan-boxes? consisting of standard subsoals and actions for
achieving high level goals. For example? if a hishschool
student intends to become a doctor? one would expect his plan to
include subsoals of applying to college? majoring in p reined?
preparing intensively for medical school entrance exams? and so
on.
What is distinctive about PAM is its innovative use of
top-down and bottom-up processing. Bottom-up processing is used
for initial story inputs 3nd matches them to conditions in PAM's
condition-action rules. Top-down processing comes into play
when PAM has some ide3 of whst
the story is about. In story 1?
PAM might mstch "John h3ted
Msry"
to rule 3. Once the hate
theme had been established? PAM
would predict that an sction
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performed by John involving M3ry might well be psrt of 3 plsn to
harm Mary. At this Juncture? PAM would revert to the bottom-up
mode? seeking matches between John's actions and the conditions
of rules of the form
If X does A then A may be part of a pl3n P to schieve go3l G
where the value of G has been determined in the top down phase.
2.1.4.1 ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
Plans and goals are among the most thoroughly researched
topics in the AI literature. For examples of hierarchical
planners? or planning systems which produce a hiersrchy of
representations? see Sacerdoti? 1974 (ABSTRIPS)? Newell and
Simon? 1972 (GPS)? Stefik? 1980 (MOLGEN)? and Hart? 1975 (NOAH).
Discussions of non-hierarchical planning systems? which rely on
a single representation of a plan? are to be found in Fikes 3nd
Nilsson? 1971 (STRIPS)? Sussman? 1975 (HACKER)? 3nd Tste? 1975
( INTERPLAN) . Opportunistic plsnning systems? in which pl3ns for
subgo3ls are developed in the order in which they are needed?
are discussed by Hayes-Roth? 1980.
2.1.5 COMPARISONS OF THE THREE SYSTEMS
It is useful at this point to compare the three story
understanding systems considered thus far. In all three? it is
assumed that 3 large store of extrslinSuistic knowledge is
reauired for even minimal understanding of stories. Both Rieger
and Wilensky embed that knowledge in condition-action rules?
although PAM does include some script-like dats structures.
Schank and Abelson? on the other hand? rely on scripts to
18
represent the knowledge reauired for story understanding*
Rieger's program employs bottom-up processing exclusively?
matching events agsinst rules snd generating as many inferences
ss possible. As an alternative to Rieger's brute force
strategy? the Schank and Abelson system relies heavily on
top-down processing. Once a script is invoked? SAM predicts
precisely what events will occur and draws inferences only when
script events are not encountered in the text. The price paid
here is lack of flexibility. Since a story event is
understandsble to SAM only when it can be paired with 3 script
event? novel events are beyond SAM's capacity to process.
The PAM system? it iti3a be srsued? is a major advance in
efforts to develop an efficient story understander. Skillfully
alternating bottom-up and top-down phases? PAM facilt3tes the
processing of novel story events while 3t the same time
constraining the number of inferences generated by the system.
The next system to be examined employs bottom-up and top-down
processing simultaneously.
2.2 DIALOGUE UNDERSTANDING SYSTEMS
2.2.1 ALLEN (1983)
Wilensky demonstrated that many intentional actions can be
profitably viewed as constituents of plans. To understand those
actions is to understand the agent's goals and the role his
actions play in efforts to achieve those goals. As might be
expected? speech 3cts are
no exception to the rule. The
immediate goal of a auestioner
is to obtain information? that of
an orderer to get someone
to do something? and that of an
19
adviser to apprise someone of his best interests.
Immediate goals of speech acts are often subgoals of larger
plans. When asked where the restrooms are located? one m3y
ssfely assume that the Question is not prompted by idle
curiosity. In such cases? knowledge of the speaker's
extralinguistic sosls is often a pre reauisite for 3 cooperative
response. Telling your male Questioner where the
ladies'
roam
is located counts as an answer to his Question? but not a
particularly helpful one. In the same vein? if one happens to
know that the men's room is out of order? it might be nice to
psss this information along? even though it has not been
specifically reauested. Finally? intelligent interpretation of
sentence fragments? e.g. "Restrooms?"? snd indirect speech sets?
e.g. "Can you direct me to the restrooms?"? often reaui re that
one hsve some ide3 of the speaker's plans.
ARGOT? a natural language dialogue system developed by
Allen (1983)? is based on Just this view of speech acts.
The fundamental assumption is thst converssnts in a
dialogue are continually monitoring the goals of other
participants. To do this they must have a rich body of
knowledge about the goals and beliefs of the
particiP3nts. ? ? Allen (1983s)? sbstrsct.
Whst is uniaue shout ARGOT is thst it actually
participates in dialogue as a helpful? cooperative partner.
Given a speech set? the system infers the speaker's
extralinguistic goal? reconstructs the probable plsn for
achieving th3t gosl? detects obst3cles in the pl3n? i.e.
subgoals "which cannot be achieved without
sssistsnee"
(Allen? 1983a? pg.3)? and plsns 3 response which will remove
those, obstacles.
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As yet? ARGOT's domain is severly circumscribed. The
system simulates 3 clerk in an information booth at a train
station snd assumes that patrons have one of three goals?
boarding 3 train? meeting 3 train? or some unspecified third
gosl. Given the input "When does the Montreal train
leave?"? ARGOT interprets the utterance as a reauest for the
departure time of the Mont res 1 tr3in. ARGOT then infers the
speaker's plan by searching for an inference P3th to the
probable goal? boarding the train. (See diagram on following
page. )
ARGOT then scrutinizes the plan for possible obstacles
and discovers two? one obvious 3nd the other probable. To
execute the pl3n? the speaker needs to know the departure
time and departure location of the Montreal train. Finally?
ARGOT plans 3 speech set? "4: 00 3t gste
7"
which removes
those obstacles. As in this example? ARGOT often provides
more information than was actuslly reauested. ARGOT is also
sble to process sentence fragments? e.g.? "Train to
Montreal?"? and indirect speech acts? e.g. "Can you tell me
when the train to Montre3l
leaves?"
When inferring the 3gent's plan? ARGOT uses two
inference mechanisms simu/staneously . From top-level goals
(boarding a train? meeting a train)? plans are expanded
downward vi3 plsn construction rules. At the S3me time?
plsns are expanded upward
from the speech act vis plsn
inference rules. Not surprisingly? pl3n
inference rules are
plan construction






















Figure 1: A Simple Plan Rec oyru/t-J fiwm
"When does the Monireal Uani
leave''"
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If an agent wants to achieve s gosl E 3nd ACT is an action
which has E as an effect? then the agent may want to execute
ACT (i.e. achieve the execution of ACT) (pg. 112)
CORRESPONDING PLAN INFERENCE RULE
(S is inferring the agent's plan)
If S believes that A has the goal of executing action ACT?
and ACT has an effect E? then S may believe that A has the
goal of achieving E. (pg. 113)
Top-level goals 3nd subgoals generated by plan
construction rules are called expectations. Subgoals
generated by plan inference rules are called altern3tives.
A plsn is S3id to be identified when s match is found
between an expectation and an alternative? completing an
inference chain from the speech act to the speaker's
presumed goal.
During the plan identification phase? heuristics are
applied to each partial plan? or expectation-slternative
pair? assigning a rating as to how likely it is to be the
actual plan. The partisl plsn with the highest rstins is
then chosen for further expansion. Ratings reflect how
well-formed the psrtisl plsn is and how closely the
alternative meshes with the expectation. Below are two
examples of heuristic rules.
Decrease the r3ting of 3 P3rtisl plan if it contains a
pending or executing action whose effects are true 3t the
time that the action commences. (Allen? 1983b? pg. 127)
(The plan is not well-formed.)
Increase the r3tins of 3 partial plan if an intersection is
found between its alterri3tive 3nd expectstion? i.e. they
contain the same action or goal. (pg. 129)
(The altern3tive meshes with the expectstion. )
When the rsting of 3 psrti3l plsn exceeds that of all
others (including the null plan) by some admittedly
22
arbitrary figure? the plan identification stage is
completed. The plan is then examined for obstacles snd an
appropriate response is constructed.
2.2.1.1 MORE EXPLOSIONS?
As Berwick observes of ARGOT?
The ability to reconstruct 3 Questioner's beliefs 3nd
intentions from surface forms is auite remarkable. It
is purchased at the price of severely restricting the
planning 3ltern3tives that can be considered. If one
can only board or meet trains? then the opportunity to
go astray is slight. And a combinatoric explosion in
inference unlikely. It is not clear whether the same
approach would work in a more realistic setting where
there were dozens or even hundreds of alternatives.
(Berwick? 1983? pg. 76)
My own feeling is that Berwick's reservations are not as
serious as they might appear* In the first place? the class of
utterances for which Allen's impressive machinery is needed is
auite limited. Secondly? for cases in which it is needed?
heuristics can be applied to reduce drastically the number and
kinds of planning alternatives to be examined.
Typically? the task of answering 3 Question can be carried
out without any knowledge of extralinguistic plans the speaker
may happen to have. Once again? consider the Question "When does
the train to Montreal leave?". If the train leaves 3t 4:00
P.M.?
then that is the answer to the
Question? whatever the speaker's
goals may happen to be. Whether the Questioner
wants to board
the train? blow it up? remove himself
from the premises before it
leaves? or report its departure time to his employee is auite
irrelevant to the Question answering task.
In some cases?
speculation about the Questioner's
plans and goals is not only
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unnecessary but actually rude or impertinent? 3s the following
examples indicate.
1. I'm new in the ares. Who is the best urologist in town?
2. Where is the nesrest drug rehsbilitstion clinic?
3. Have you seen the man in the photograph?
(asked by a policeman)
Clearly? Allen's 3ssumption thst cooper3tive discourse
reaui res thst "converssnts in 3 dialogue constantly monitor the
goals of other participants" does not apply in these cases. And
this is fortunste. Unlike ARGOT? s genersl dislogue system need
infer the goals and plans of 3 Questioner only when that is
necessary to answer 3 Question.
Sometimes the Question answering task does fit Allen's model
of cooperative conversation. Suppose one is asked for directions
to a local museum. Several answers are possible? depending on
the speaker's mode of transport. Does he plan to travel by foot?
car? or public transportstion? Here one must know the skeleton
of the plan before one can formulate a helpful response. Note?
however? that the number of plan alternatives to be considered in
such cases is auite small? certainly not the dozens or hundreds
feared by Berwick. Note also th3t in the absence of obvious
cues? e.g? the speaker is riding 3 bicycle or st3ridins at a bus
stop? one would never blindly attempt to infer the speaker's
travel plans. In general? when knowledge of a spesker's plsns is
reauired for 3 helpful answer to a Question? 3nd such knowledge
is not resdily inferrable from the context? conversants ask the
speaker for clarification. There is no reason why a general
system which simulates a participant in dialogue should not be
expected to do the same.
2.2.1.2 ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
For an excellent treatment of the theory of cooperative
discourse underlying ARGOT? see Cohen (1978) and Cohen and
Perrsult (1979). Cohen argues that speech acts can be regarded
as operators in a planning system 3nd shows how "plans can link
speech 3cts with non-linguistic
behavior"
(Cohen? 1978? pg. 3).
A plan-b3sed natural language system similar in many respects to
ARGOT is being developed by Brachman et si. at Bolt Beranek and
Newman. The system "recognizes indirect 3s well as direct
reauests by hypothesizing a Pl3n th3t the user is trying to carry
out"
(Brachmsn? 1979? 3bstr3ct). Formal planning theory itself
is generally attributed to Ernst and Newell (1969) and Fikes and
Nilsson (1973). Also see Newell and Simon (1972). The theory of
speech acts was developed by Searle (1969? 1975).
2.3 LANGUAGE VS DOMAIN DRIVEN SYSTEMS
A langu3ge driven understanding system is one which depends
primarily on syntactic? semantic and pragmatic information to
process texts. By contrast? a domain driven system depends
heavily on domain specific knowledge to accomplish the same task.
(See Kaplan? 1983? for more on
this useful distinction.) Domain
driven systems? e.g. SAM (Schank
and Abelson? 1977)? PAM
(Wilensky? 1983) and ARGOT (Allen? 1983) have achieved
spectacular successes. As has been widely
recognized? however?
they are inherenentla
limited by the vast amounts of domain
specific knowledge they reaui re to understand even the simplest
texts.
The thesis I am proposing is a modest attempt to develop 3
smsll? ressonsbly efficient? language driven understanding system
in which the need for domain specific knowledge is minimized. I
suspect that linguistic cues play 3 more important role in
language comprehension than has been commonly supposed. I also
suspect that speech act analysis proves a useful tool for
systematicslly investigsting those cues.
As 3 preliminsry illustration of how domain and language
driven approaches to understanding might differ? consider the
following story example from Wilensky? together with his
commentary.
One day John went through a red light and was pulled
over by a cop. John had Just gotten a summons for
speeding the previous week? and was told that if he got
another violation? his license would be taken away*
Then John remembered that he h3d two tickets for the
Gisnt's game on him. He told the cop that he would
give them to him if he forgot the whole incident. The
cop happened to be a terrific football fan. He took
John's tickets and drove awaa.
Ql Why did John offer the cop s couple of tickets?
AI Because he was afraid he was going to lose his
license if he got another summons. (1978?pgs. 2-3)
Wilensky has this to say about the story.
Consider what is involved in making the inference
that John offered the cop his football tickets to
prevent the loss of his license. First? the resder
would hsve to infer thst the cop was going to give John
a traffic ticket. This inference reaui res the
knowledge that a policeman is supposed to ticket people
who break traffic rules...
Next? the re3der must infer
thst John didn't want to
lose his license. For
this inference the reader needs
to know the kinds of
things people. . .might want to
prevent from happening. ? ?
Having inferred thst John
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wanted to hang on to his license? the resder must then
infer thst preventing a cop from issuing a summons
would prevent the authorities from taking awaa his
license. This inference is bssed on the principle thst
if one event can cause another event? then 3 waa to
prevent the second us to prevent the first.
Now the re3der must interpret John's statement to
the cop 3S an attempt to prevent him from giving him 3
ticket. To interpret this sentence as an offer? 3
resder must know thst one way to prevent someone from
doing something is to persuade him not to do it* ???by
offering him something desirable in exchange for his
cooperation ? The understander can (then) infer that
football tickets are desirable to a football fan? since
football tickets 3re necessara for getting into s
footbsll game*
Wilensky? of course? is setting the tsble for s domain
driven theory of understanding in which large stores of
extralinguistic knowledge are reauired for story comprehension ?
Now consider the same story from a language driven perspective
where the understander has little or no domain knowledge
available to him.
1. One day A did B and was approached by C.
2. A h3d Just been given 3 D for doing E the previous week? and
was told th3t if he got another D? then F would happen*
3. Then A remembered that he had a G with him.
4. He told C that he would give him a G if C did not give him a
D.
5. C wanted the G.
6. He took the G and did not give A a D.
A - John




F = John loses his license
G = football tickets
An understander would make
little headway with this version
of the story until
reaching statement 4? where it becomes
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evident that A has either promised or threatened to give C a G*
Since C wants a G (statement 5)? there is a strong likelihood
that A has conditionally promised C a G? although the remote
possibility of an infelicitous threat remains. Giver, the
purpose of conditional promises of this type (see 4.1.2)? the
understander can now conclude that A does not want C to give him
a D. At this Juncture it has been established thst from A's
point of view? getting snother D is undesi rsble. Now some sense
can be made of statement 2. There is the strong probability
that the reason why getting another D is undesirable is because
it would lead to F. So F too is most likely undesirable from
A's perspective. The understander now knows all it needs to
know about this schematic story to answer the sample Question*
Ql Why did A offer G to C?
AI Because A was afraid that F would happen if C gave D to A*
This example suggests that understanding the general
structure of such stories reaui res little if any domain specific
knowledge* The nece&ssary inferences can be made from semantic
cues embedded in the text. Domain knowledge undoubtedly
enriches and deepens comprehension. For human understanders?
such knowledge expedites and may even be reauired for
comprehension. But appsrently? it is not as fundamental to the





What is the meaning of a sentence? Whst is it for a
sentence to have a meaning? Theories purporting to answer such
Questions fall for the most psrt into three csteSories -
referential? ideation3l snd beh3vior3l accounts of sentential
meaning.
Referential theories? favored by logicians? e.g. J.S. Mill
(1906)? Gottlob Frege (1952)? Alonzo Church (1951) and C.I Lewis
(1952)? hypothesize th3t sll linguistic expressions? including
sentences? refer to (denote? desisri3te? signify) something other
than themselves. On this view? the meaning of a linguistic
expression is to be identified with the relation between the
expression and that to which it refers.
The ideationsl theory of meaning? associated with the 17th
century philosopher John Locke? assumes a sharp distinction
between the public realm of language and the private domain of
thoughts 3nd ide3s. On this view? "The use of words.. .is to be
the sensible marks of ideas and the ideas they stand for are
their proper and immediate
significance"
(Locke? Section 1?
Chspter 2? Book iii). In more contemporary versions of the
theory? meaning is defined in terms of the dispositions of
expressions to produce psycholosic3l effects in the hearer
(Stevenson? 1944? Grice? 1957).
Behavioral theories of meaning are motivated to 3 large
extent by the successes of behaviorsl psychology. The
29
unobservable mental events posited by ideational accounts are
here replaced by overt behavior (Bloomfield? 1935) or behaviorsl
dispositions (Morris? 1946). According to Bloomfield? the
"mesning of 3 linguistic form..." is to be defined in terms of
"...the situation in which the speaker utters it and the
response which it calls forth from the
hearer"
(Bloomfield?
p. 139). This view is developed and refined in a cl3ssic 3rticle
by C.C. Fries (1951). Charles Morris argues that it is an
integral P3rt of the mesning of an expression such as "Come into
the house
now"
that if the hearer is inclined or strongly
disposed to obey the speaker? he will in f3ct come in the house.
Other vsrisnts of the behsvioral theory are to be found in the
works of W.V.O. Quine (1960) and Paul Ziff (1960).
The theory of speech acts is s recent addition to the field
and to some extent defies cateSoriz3tion. Hesvily influenced by
the work of Wittgenstein (1953)? Austin (1962)? Alston (1964)
snd Grice (1957)? it h3s gained an audience among linguists?
cognitive psychologists and philosophers. John Searle's SPEECH
ACTS (1969) is the single most influential publication to date
in this area*
An assumption? t3cit or otherwise? of ana viable theory of
meaning is that not only the syntax but the meaning of
linguistic expressions is rule governed. Much of the interest
in Searle's work can be
attributed to the fact that it is
argusbly the first serious attempt
in the litersture
systematically to investigate this assumption and its
conseouences. If the meaning of linguistic
expressions is rule
governed and if such rules
can be formulated and systematized?
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it follows that semsntics is indeed s proper area of scientific
inauiry.
3*2 SEARLE (1965)
The hypothesis on which Searle's theory is b3sed is stated
in chapter 1 of SPEECH ACTS (1969? pg *16)*
(S)peaking 3 language is performing speech acts such as
making statements? giving commands? 3sking Questions? making
promises? 3nd so on. ? ? (T)hese acts are in general m3de
possible by 3nd performed in accordance with certain rules
for the use of linguistic elements.
The following example? borrowed from Alston (1964? ch 2)
will serve as s focsl point for our discussion ss to how this
hypothesis is to be fleshed out. Suppose th3t 3 speaker S utters
a sentence St? "Please open the door". Is S reauesting that some
hearer H open a door? Not necessarily. S? for example? may be
reciting 3 line in a r-lay or engaged in a language lesson. When
S's utterance is intended ss a serious reauest? there are at
least six situational features that are normally present.
1. There is a hearer(s) H.
2. There is a door which is singled out by the context.
3. The door is not alre3dy open.
4. It is possible for H to open the door.
5. S hss some interest in getting H to open the door.
6. the words are uttered in an attempt to get H to open the door.
Note th3t these situational features together serve as a
template or schema for non-defective reauests to open a
particular door. In situations in which one or more of these
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features 3re not present? the reauest misfires. If? for exsmple?
there are two closed doors in the room (feature 2)? H cannot know
precisely what he is being asked to do. If there is a single
door? but it is alresdy open (feature 3)? the reauest is
pointless and unsstisf isble. If H has left the room 3nd is out
of earshot (condition 1)? it is doubtful that a reauest has been
made at all. On the other hand? in circumstances in which all
six features are present? the reauest is clear? unambiguous and
satisf iable.
On the speech act theory? given a sentence and the speech
3ct which is performed when thst sentence is uttered seriously
snd liter3lly? the set of situational features or conditions
under which that speech act is performed non-defectively are in
some sense relevant to the meaning of that sentence. Actuslly?
the claim is much stronger than that. According to Searle? those
conditions constitute snd fully specify the meaning of the
sentence.
To appreciate the stronger cl3im? it will be helpful to
consider Searle's distinction between regulative snd constitutive
rules. Certsin sets of rules reSul3te sntecedently existing
behsvior. The rules of etiauette? for exsmple? resul3te soci3l
inter3ctions which would take plsce with or without those rules.
Other sets of rules? as well as regulating certain activities?
create their very possibility. The
classic example here are the
rules of chess? which
define the game as well 3s regulste its
play. Should one change those
rules by allowing rooks to move
diagonally? pawns to move bsckwards? and so on? one would no
longer be playing chess.
The rules of chess are constitutive?
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that is? they create the possibility of playing the game C3lled
chess.
Sesrle's contention amounts to this. The set of conditions
C under which a speech act Sp is performed non-defectively create
the possibility of performing Sp by serving as its set of
constitutive rules.
Assume for the moment that this is true. For what reasons
3re such conditions thought to be relevsnt to the meaning of
sentences? Consider our sample sentence St? "Plesse close the
door". Intuitively? one feels thst the litersl meaning or
function of St is to perform a speech act? the 3ct of using words
to reauest someone to open 3 door. If the conditions under which
thst set can be performed non-defectively actually define the act
being performed by serving 3s its constitutive rules? it is
reasonsble to conclude thst those conditions do in fact specify
the meaning of St.
The central Question? then? is whether such conditions
plausibly can be regarded as constitutive rules for non-defective
speech acts in the same way? for example? that a certain set of
rules can be regarded as the constitutive rules of chess. Searle
snd other proponents of speech set theory advance two related
considerations in support of their constitutive rule thesis? both
heavily dependent on the anslogy between language and chess.
In the first pl3ce? we are told that Just ss one cannot
modify the rules of chess without creating a new? albeit rel3ted?
boardgame which cannot be eauated with chess? one cannot modify
the conditions under which a
speech act is non-defective without
changing the type of speech act
being performed. Suppose that
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the following condition is added to our example set.
7. H's refusing to open the door would count as 3n act of
disobedience.
Now when S utters the words "Plesse open the
door"
the speech 3ct
being performed is clearly a command? not a reauest. Modifying
the conditions? then? brings about a substantive chsnse in the
nature of the speech 3ct being performed? which is Just what we
would expect if those conditions were truly constitutive.
Secondly? and to continue the ari3logy? speech set theorists
3sk us to consider the fsct that playing the game of chess as
opposed to some other boardsame involves acknowledging the
legitimacy and authority of its constitutive rules. The
important point here is that having the appropriste attitude
towards those rules is not Just a matter of good sportsmanship?
but is s necessara condition of plsyins the same. If players are
told th3t a particular move is forbidden by the rules of chess
and choose to ignore this admonition or regard it as irrelevant?
it is clear that they are not playing chess but some other game.
Here note the contrast with cases in which the regulative rules
of chess are violated or ignored. However boorish he maa be? the
Player who distrscts his opponent? even sfter being told thst
this is s viol3tion of the rules? is still paying chess.
If the set of conditions under which 3 speech 3ct is
performed non-defectively is constitutive of thst speech act? one
would expect the speaker who
performs that speech act to
acknowledge the legitimacy and
relevancy of those conditions.
And indeed this expectation
does appear to be satisfied to a
large extent. Imagine thst
H is under the impression thst S has
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asked him to open a particul3r door in s room. H notices thst
all the doors are closed and brings this to S's attention
(condition 3 is unsatisfied). S replies that however interesting
that may be? it has nothing to do with the matter at hand. The
only conclusion left open to H is that he has misinterpreted S?
that S did not perform the speech 3ct thst H thought he h3d
performed.
Thus far? we have confined the discussion to cons iderst ion
of 3 single speech 3ct? that of reauestins someone to open a
door. But the theory can Quite naturally be generalized to cover
a large range of speech acts. A program which recognizes
promises? advice? thre3ts 3nd warnings is outlined in some detail
in chapter 4*
3.2*1 ADDITIONAL RESEARCH
For useful discussions of speech act theory? see FinSarette
(1967)? Davis (1979)? Bird (1981)? Vanderveken (1983) and Roulet
(1984). For analyses of individual speech acts? see Peetz (1977?
promises and threats)? Bird (1981? warnings)? and Stewart (1978?
advice). The taxonomy of speech acts is still unclear? although
advsnces hsve been msde by Sesrle (1975 (2)) and Frsser (1975).
The snslysis of indirect speech sets is 3 subject of heated
controversy in linguistics where competing theories abound. See
Gordon and Lakoff (1975)? Herringer (1972)? Sadock (1970)? as
well as Searle (1969? 1975).
4. PROJECT DESCRIPTION
4.1 SPEECH ACTS AND PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS
4*1*1 ADVICE
Following Searle (Speech Acts? 1969? pg. 67) ? I tske it thst
s speaker's utterance counts ss advising the hearer to do A if
1* the propositional content of S's utterance is a future set A
of H (viz* "H will do A")
2* S believes thst A is in H's best interests
3* the speaker's utterance is 3n undertaking to the effect that A
is in H's best interests.
Condition 1 is clearly necessary. One cannot advise someone
to do what has already been done. Strictly speaking? condition 2
is not necessary? since insincere advice is possible. The
program will assume sincerity on the part of the speaker. It
would be convenient if 1 and 2 implied 3? but they do not? as the
following example illustrates.
1* Doing A would certainly improve your finances.
2. However? it would wreak havoc with your home life.
Given the context? this is clearly not an instance of advising H
to do A? even though condition 1 snd possibly 2 are satisfied.
Whst is needed is some clear contextusl indicstion th3t sll
things considered? doing A is in the best interests of H from S's
point of view. For exsmple?
1* Doing A would improve your
finances*
2. However? it would wreak
hsvoc with your homelife.
3* Personally? I (don't)
think it is worth it*
3'. If I were in your
position? I would (not) do A.
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Whst is needed? in other words? is the conclusion of the
practical argument of which 1 and 2 are premises.
4*1.2 PROMISES
For an extended discussion of promising? see Searle (Speech
Acts? Ch 3). Here it is sufficient to note the conceptual
relation between promising and obligation* The speaker who
promises to do A not only indicates his intention to do A but
voluntarily undertakes an obligation to do A. Unless there are
serious extenuating circumstances? the agent who fails to keep a
promise opens himself to criticism on moral grounds.
In the absence of performative expressions such as "I
promise to..."? "You have my word that..."? etc.? promises are
notoriously difficult speech 3cts to identify. W3s MscArthur's
"I sh3ll
return"
a prediction? an expression of intention? or a
promise? When it is important to make such distinctions? we
often resort to interrogating the speaker? "Is that a promise?"?
"Do I have your word on
that?"
The program I am proposing will process arguments of the
form "If X then Y. So (don't) do Z". For this limited class of
cases? the problem of recognizing promises appears tractsble.
When Y is of the form "I will do
A"
3nd when the speaker's doing
A would benefit the hearer? it is natural to regard "If X then Y.
So (don't) do Z 3s a promise. For
example?
If you get an A on your
exam? I will take you to a movie tonight.
So study hard and get an A.
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In such cases? the speaker strikes a barssin with the hearer and
so incurs an obligation to live up to the terms of the bargain.
Bargains? agreements? deals? etc.? are species of promises. In
the limited context of the proposed program? then? the conditions
under which "If X then
Y"
counts as a promise are!
1. the propositional content of Y is 3 future act A of S (or
state to be brought anout by S)
2. S believes that A will benefit H




Searle (Speech Acts? pg67) analyzes warnings as follows.
S's utterance constitutes a warning if
1* the propositions! content of the utterance is a future event?
state? etc* E*
2* S believes that E will occur and is not in H's best interests
3. S's utterance counts as an undertaking to the effect that E is
not in H's best interests*
Searle comments that this is an account of "categorical not
hypothetical warnings* Most warnings are probably hypotheticsl :
'If you do not do then Y will occur'".
Here is 3 preliminsry attempt to adapt Searle's account to
hypothetical warnings. An utterance of the form "If X then
Y"
constitutes a warning if
1. the propositionsl content of
Y is a future event? state? etc*
E.
2. the propositional
content of X is a future sction A of H*
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3. S believes that E will occur if H does A.
4. S believes that E is not in H's best interests.
5. S's utterance counts as an undertaking to the effect th3t E is
not in H's best interests.
Conditions 1 and 2 are too strong? as illustrated by the
following esses.
If the Plant closes? resl est3te values will be halved. Don't
buy a house anywhere near that town.
(Condition 2 is unsatisfied.)
If the reports are accurate? the ship sank with no survivors. So
don't get your hopes up.
(Conditions 1 and 2 are unsatisfied*)
The following revisions seem in order* An utterance of the form
"If X then
Y"
constitutes a warning if
1* the propositions], content of Y is some event? state? etc* E.
2. S believes that if X is true E will occur (has occured).
3. S believes that E is not in the best interests of H.
4* S's utterance counts as an undertaking to the effect that E is
not in H's best interests.
Collectively? conditions 1 through 4 are sufficient to
establish that S has warned H that if X then Y. But obviously
more is reauired to establish that S has warned H (not) to do Z.
Condition 5 seems to do the trick.
5. The propositional content of the imperative conclusion is 3
future action? viz.? H's (not) doing Z.
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4.1.4 THREATS
A curious fact about threats is that an utterance may be
accurately characterized as a threat even though it W3S not
intended 3S s threat. Assume that H is three months behind in his
car payments.
S: If you can't pay us something? we will have to repossess the
car.
H (later): They are threatening to repossess the car if we don't
come up with some money.
S may have intended his remark as 3 point of information and
nothing more? that is? he was not trying to frighten or coerce H
into making his car payments. Nonethless? there is nothing
misleading or inaccurate about H's charscterizstion of S's
utterance ss 3 threat. (Warnings are similar to threats in this
respect. In the case of unintentional warnings? S warns H
without intending to warn him or even being aw3re th3t he is
wsrning him. >
Apparently? an utterance of the form "If X then
Y"
is
INTENDED as a threat if
1. the propositional content of Y is s future set A of S (or a
state to be brought sbout by S).
2. S believes thst A is not in H's best interests.
3. S's utterance counts as an attempt to frighten
H? to overpower
H? to coerce H into performing
some action? etc.
Yet accurately characterizing
utterances of that form as threats
reauires only that conditions 1 and
2 be S3tisfied. Since it is
difficult to imagine how 3
n3tursl language processing system
could test condition 3?




Practical arguments of immediate interest are of the form
If X then Y
So (don't) do Z
An intelligent paraphraser will recognize th3t in all such
cases the premise is being sdvsnced ss a sufficient or decisive
reason for the hearer (not) to do Z. In addition? the
paraphraser should be able to distinguish five possible relations
between X? Y? and Z. The first two relations assume that the
propositional content of Y is some event or state E which is in
the hearer's best interests.
Relation 1* H's (not) doing Z will sccomplish? fscilitste? or
make it more likely that X.
Examples:
If the company chooses this location? property values will soar.
So do what you can to influence the board to choose this
location.
If we win tomorrow? we will be league champions.
So let's give it 3ll we've got.
Rel3tion 2: H's (not) doing Z will enhance the value of E or will
3llow H to take full 3dv3ntsge of E.
Examples*
If the company chooses this location? real estate values will
soar.
So don't sell your house Just yet.
(So buy as much land ss you can within the next month.)
The next pair of relations assume
that E is not in the
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hearer's best interests.
Relation 3: H's (not) doing Z will make it less likely that X or
will bring about a state of aff3irs which is incompstible with X.
Example:
If you move to Manitoba? you will be isolated from the civilized
world.
So refuse their offer.
Relation 4: H's (not) doing Z will minimize or eliminate the
negative impact of E,
Example*
If they close the plant? property values will fall.
So sell your house now before it's too late.
The l3st rel3tion reaui res no assumptions about E. E may
benefit H? harm H? or have no direct bearing on H's interests.
Relation 5: Since Y if X? H's (not) doing Z will facilitate or
make it more likely that D where D is some desirable event or
state of aff3irs.
Ex3inples:
If the master was murdered? there should be evidence of foul
play.
Search the grounds.
D = determining the fate of the master
If the fugitive is still in the
areat he will probsbly contact
his girlfriend.
So put a tail on Sweet Sue.
D = determining whether the
fugitive contacts his girlfriend.
If we don't provide
assistance? thousands of Africans will die.
So give generously.
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D = saving lives (morally desirable end)
Arguments which instantiate relation 5 are beyond the scope of
the proposed program.
4.2.2 DATA STRUCTURES FOR THE FIVE RELATIONS
Data Structure for Rl :
X-POSITIVE LISTS - actions which if performed would facilitste or
make it more likely that X. Lists are maintained for all actions
and states of aff3irs to which the speaker makes reference.
Dsts structure for R3:
X-NEGATIVE LISTS - actions which if performed would make it less
likely that X. Lists are maintained for all actions and ststes
of 3ffsirs to which the speaker makes reference.
Data structure for R2:
BENEFIT LIST
- Each benefit list contains
1. a st3te of 3ffsirs SA which from S's point of view is in
the best interests of H
2* s set of 3ctions snd ststes of
sffsirs which would
increase the benefit value of SA? or allow
H to take full
advantage of SA*
Since few SA's are
unconditionally in an agent's best
interests? lists may contain
states of affairs which are
necessary or sufficient
conditions of SA's being in H's best
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interests. For example? the fact th3t property values in your
neighborhood are rising is in your best interests only if you own
a house. Having money is useful only if you have sn opportunity
to spend it? snd so on.
Dsts Structure for R4i
HARM LIST - esch hsrm list contains
1. a state of affairs? SA? which from the speaker's point of
view is not in the hearer's best interests
2. a set of actions or ststes of sffsirs which decrease or
eliminate the harm value of SA.
Agsin? since few SA's are unconditionally not in an agent's
best interests? lists m3y contain actions or states of affairs
which are incompatible with necessary or sufficient conditions of
SA's being harmful to H. For example? the prospect of falling
property values in your neighborhood poses a problem for you only
if you own 3 house. Selling the house solves the problem.
D3ts structure for R5: none
4.3 SOME HEURISTICS
Heuristic 1
1. If you finish your homework? I will give you some more castor
oil to drink.
So finish your homework.
2. If you don't finish your homework? I
will give you some more
castor oil to drink.
So finish your homework.
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In neither case is there ana difficulty in deducing S's views on
castor oil* In the first example? it is promised as 3 reward?
and in the second is threatened ss s punishment* What makes
these deductions possible is the relationship between the
propositional contents of the imper3tive snd the sntecedent of
the conditional* In the first instance they are identical? in
the second? the one is the negation of the other. The
paraphraser should utilize this heuristic when identifying speech
acts and building BENEFIT and HARM lists.
Heuristic 2
3. If you finsh your homework? I will give you some more castor
oil to drink.
So get started.
4. If you don't finish your homework? I will give you some more
castor oil to drink. So get started.
Since getting started on a project increases (dramsticslly ) the
likelihood of finishing it? it is obvious thst example 3 is a
promise and example 4 a threat. The paraphraser* then? should be
able to make similar deductions based on the contents of its
X-POSITIVE and X-NEGATIVE lists. This is another way in which
speech 3cts can be identified and new items added to the BENEFIT
and HARM lists.
Heuristic 3
5. If you buy that stock and hang on to it? you will be rich
within six months.
So listen to your broker.
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6. If you buy th3t stock snd hsns on to it? you will be poor
within six months.
So listen to your broker.
Since being rich is in H's interests 3nd being poor is not? in
both examples we know exactly what the broker has advised H to
do* In general? when the state of sffsirs described in the
consequent is known to be or not to he in H's best interests? one
is sble to ri3rrow the rsnse of possible relations to two: Rl 3nd
R2 or R3 snd R4* In example 5? listening to his broker would make
it more likely that H would buy the stock (Rl)? in example 6 less
likely (R3). The paraphraser should m3ke simil3r deductions
bssed on the contents of its BENEFIT snd HARM lists.
Heuristic 4
7. If you studied for the test then you will pass.
So relax.
8. If you didn't study for the test then you will fail for sure.
So resign yourself to the inevitable.
In both 7 snd 8? the verb in the 3ntecedent is in the psst
tense. So in neither esse are relations
Rl or R3 a possibility.
The. relation must be R2 or R4. If it
is known that passing is in
the 3gent's interests 3nd failing
is not? the exact relation C3n
be deduced: R2 in example 7?





X? Y? Z : propositions
XS : subject of proposition X
XV : predicste of proposition X




is sn imperative of the form
"ZV!"
(# Cases 1-4 exploit a syntactic relation between X an Z.
Heuristic 1 *)
1. If X = Z
YS - speaker
tense of YV is future
mood of YV is active
then assume Rl promise: goto 11
2. If X = Z
then assume Rl sdvise: goto 11
3. If X = -Z
YS - speaker
tense of YV is future
mood of YV is active
then assume R3 threat: goto 11
4. If X = -Z
then assume R3 warning: goto 11
(# In the interests of readability? the remaining cases are
outlined in somewhat less detail. *)
(# In cases 5X6? there is no obvious syntactic relation between
X and Z. *>
(# Promise or Advise *>
5. If Z is s member of the
X~positive list
then assume Rl (promise or advise):
goto 11
else if Z is 3 member of the Y-benefit list
then assume R2 (promise or advise): goto 11
else if XV is in the past tense
and there is a Y-benefit
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list
then assume R2 (promise or advise): goto 11.
(* Threat or warning *)
6. If Z is 3 member of the X-negative list
then assume R3 (threat or warning): goto 11
else if Z is 3 member of the Y-h3rm list
then assume R4 (threat or W3rnins): goto 11
else if XV is in the past tense 3nd there is s Y-hsrm list
then assume R4 (threat or warning): goto 11.
(* Give up and start asking Questions *)
7. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING MOST ACCURATELY DESCRIBES S'S VIEW OF
H'S SITUATION?
A. Y IS IN H'S INTERESTS
B. Y IS NOT IN H'S INTERESTS
C. Y DOES NOT AFFECT H'S INTERESTS ONE WAY OR THE OTHER
esse :
3. start a benefit list for Y: goto 8
b. start a harm list for Y: goto 9
c. advise the user that the text is beyond the scope of the
program ?
(* Promise or advise #)
8. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING MOST ACCURATELY DESCRIBES S'S VIEW OF
H'S SITUATION?
A. H SHOULD DO ZV IN ANTICIPATION OF Y
B. H'S DOING ZV WOULD INCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF X
C. NEITHER OF THE ABOVE
case?
s. Z is added to Y-benefit list: goto 5
b. Z is 3dded to the X-Positive list 3nd not-Z to the
X-negative list: goto 5
c. 3dvise the user th3t the text is beyond the scope of the
pro-ram.
<* Thre3t or warning *)
9. WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING MOST ACCURATELY DESCRIBES S'S VIEW OF
H'S SITUATION?
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A. H SHOULD DO ZV IN ANTICIPATION OF Y
B. H'S DOING ZV WOULD DECREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF Y
C. NEITHER OF THE ABOVE
case:
a. Z is added to the Y-harm list: goto 6
b. Z is added to the X-neSative list and not-Z to the
X-positive list: goto 6
c. 3dvise the user thst the text is beyond the
scope of the
pro_ram.
11. Paraphrase the input
(* Ask for confirmation *)
12. HAS THE TEXT BEEN ACCURATELY
PARAPHRASED?
If no? goto 7
If yes?
case:
Rl (promises 3nd advise):
Ensure th3t
1. there is 3 Y-benefit
list
2. there is 3n X-benefit
list
(* X's benefit value
is inherited from Y *>
3. there is a
Z-benefit list
(* Z's benefit
value derives from the fact

















1. Z is a component of the Y-benefit list
2 there is an X benefit list
(* X's benefit value is inherited from Y *)
R4 (threats and warnings):






Inputs for the program outlined in this proposal are simple
practical arguments with one premise and an imperative
conclusion ? A more sophisticated version of the program would be
capable of processing arguments
1. with multiple premises? e.g.?
If you do A then B will occur.
And if B occurs then C will occur.
So do A.
2. with compound conclusions? e.g.?
If you do A then B will occur.
But if B occurs then C will occur unless you do D.
So do D and then do A.
3. with conclusions expressed in moods other than the imperstive?
e.g.?
If I were you? I would do A.
I warn you not to do A.
Why don't you do A?
4. with a greater range of
speech acts embedded in conclusions?
eg? reauests? pleas?
admonitions? instructions? exhortations?
etc** as well as
promises? advice? thrests and warnings^
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For additional enhancements? see section 1*3*
4*6 LIBRARY SEARCH
Principle sources for the library search were
1. THE SCIENTIFIC DATALINK INDEX TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
2. INTERNATIONAL JOINT CONFERENCE ON AI (UCAI)
3. AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (AAAI)
4. THEORETICAL ISSUES IN NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING (TINLAP)
5. ASSOCIATION FOR COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS (ACL)
6. THE HANDBOOK OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
7. PHILOSOPHER'S INDEX
4.7 LANGUAGE
The program is rule based. So I chose PROLOG.
5. PROGRAM
isis!hkd4302C30ZI date





/* Resd a text? paraphrase its meaning 3nd identify the
princiP3l speech set. */
start (Sent ?Nextsent > :-
doit (Sent?Nextsent) ?
speech.act (Code?Act ?Rel) ?





stsrt(Sentl ?Nextsentl ) ) .
/% Re3d 3 sentence and enter its propositional content (s>
in the databsse */
doit (Sent ?Nextsent ) :-
resd_in (Sent?Nextsent ) ?
build_subJ(Sent ? CC3 ?sD ?Ans? 1 ?Rest ) ?
3bolish(after_verb?l) ?
addterm(Ans? Ansl ) ?
rev(Ansl ?Ans2) ?
prop.cont (Ans2?More) .
/ j, .a, v^
ijj ii* \tj / iif ^U ^U \t J* -i^ J/ J.' -^ "J/ Jf _f 4f _^ _f _f _f _f _^ _^ 'bfc' /
/ %\^^^^^ ^*^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ *P^^^ +T*^/
/* Re3d 3 sentence
- Clocksin _ Mellish? pg. 87 */
/******************************/
resd_in(CWord ! Ws3 ?Nextsent)
:~
setO(C>? re3dword(C?Word?Cl ) ?
restsent(Word?Cl ?Ws?Nextsent ) ?
restsent(W?_?r:?C_)
:~ lsstword( W) ? ! ?
restsent(W?_?CWi:Ws_?CWliWs_)
:-
l3stword(W) ? ! ?
restsent(W?C?CWl ! Wsl ?Nextsent)
:-
re3dword(C?Wl ?C1) ? restsent(Wl ?C1 ?Ws?Nextsent) ?
re3dword(C?W?Cl)








resdword(C?W?C2) :- getO(Cl)? resdword(Cl ?W?C2) .





single_character(44) . /% r %/
single_charscter(59) . /* ; #/
single_ch3rscter(58) ? /* : %/
single_chsr3cter(63) ? /% ? %/
single_chsrscter(33) * /% \ %/
single_ch3r3cter (46) ? /# ? %/
in_word(C?C) :- C>="a"? C=<"z"* /* a?b?*..?z */
in_word(C?L) :- C>="A"? C=<"Z"?
L is C--A-+-3". /* A?B?.*.?Z */



















/ \A* *\t -^^
.Jj ^^ >J* -^^ ^^ ^O iXf t^ >!/ ^U \^ \i/ ^* ^U v^ ^b tl/ i^ ^/ ii/ \^ \0 ^/ <^ ^^ J/ vL? \1/ ^U v|/ ^f \L* ^J^ U/ %0 ^/ ^f t^ ^/ Jy ^^ iJ/ tLr i^ y
/ **l ^p ^p ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ /p ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ ^^ /p^ ^^ ^^ ^p ^^ *^ ^^ ^ ^* ^^ ^ ^ ^^ ^^ *p^ ^ i ^^ i i^ *i* i *t> ^% /p ^^ *t\ ^^ ^* ^^^^
/* Reverse 3 list
- Clocksin % Mellish? pg* 41 */
rev(Ll?L2)
:-
revzap (LI ? CD ?L2) ?
revzap(CX!L_?L2?L3)
:-
revzap (L ? CX ! L23 ?L3) ?
revzap( C3 ?L?L) .











punctuation (Next) ? ! ?
write(Next) ?
write_rest(Rest) ?





name (Word? -First!Rest-) ?
caplet(First?NewFirst) ?




































r T* *P ^PT ^P ^P ^P ^S ^P ^P ^P *P ^^ ^P- ^P ^P ^P ^P ^P
*
*o ^P ^S *P '^ n^ *J^ *T"
*
^P ^P ^P ^S *^ ^P* ^P ^P 'P T* M* ^P ^P *^ 'P ^P ^P ^S ^P ^P ^P ^P ^r ^P '
/# Build-subJect identifies the nounphrsse subjects of
propositions. For ex3mple? assume the sentence to be
processed is: <if? the? Celtics? win? then? the? citizens?
of? boston? will? celebrate? .>. Bui Id-SubJect (in
conjunction with rev) will return <if? <np? <celtics? the?
win? then? <np? <boston? of? citizens? the? will?
celebrate? . >. */
/********#*#*********************
buildsubJ(__ ?_?_?_?_) .
build_subJ(_bye? ._ ?CS?sD?II . ? bye _? Level ?Rest ) ?
buildsubJ(C. !_. ?CS?U3 ?S?Level ? C, !__) .
bui 1 d_subJ ( C . ! _- ? CS ? U J ? S ?Level ?Rest ) .
bui ld_subJ ( CH ! T_ ? US ?p.1?CS?p-?Level? CH!T_)
:-
is_s(H? verb?.-) ?
bui ld_subJ(T? C CH! S3 ?U_? Ans? Level?Rest) .
bui ld_subJ(CH!T3?CS?U3?Ans? Level?Rest) t-
is_a(H?conn) ?
abolish(sfter_verb?l) ?
bu i 1d_subJ ( T ? C CH ! S3 ? U3 ?Ans ? 1 ?Rest ) ,
bui ld_subJ ( CH ! T3 ? CS?p3?CS?p3?Level ?CH!T3) :-
is_3(H? verb?_) ?
after_verb(Level) .
bui ld_subJ ( CF i CX ! T3 3 ?CS?U3?Ans? Level? Rest) :-
(is_a(F?verb?_) ?
not(is_a(X?verb?_> ) ?
3ssertz(af ter_verb(Level ) ) ?
p __ p) ,
f i ndnp (CF!CX!T33?Cnp?C33? Resu 1 1 ? S ? U ?Ans ?Level ?Rest ) .



















J, ^, ^ J^
J,
^ ^ .^ ^ ^ ^, .1^
yt. ^t.
^^ ,1, ,], ^
J.
,^ ,1,
.I. .1, J. /
X ^^^ T*^^ T^^^^^^^^^^^ T*^^^^^^ fl*^ T*^^^ *T*^^ T^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^SP
*
T* /,
/% Find the nounphrase subject of the proposition */
/ ,^> *^ ^^
qJ.
^^




\^ *^ -^ \^ -Jv ^^ tl/ "^ *ts J^ ^/ ^^ i^ ^^ J/ ^b ^/ ^Jj ^/ v|j O/ -^ ^b ^Xr \|/ \b i^ vk ^/ \^ ^^ %!/ i^ lXr ^/ ^b *^ t^ v^ %!/ ^/ /
jT ^p* ^p^T ^^ ^^ ^* '^p 'f^ ^p. fl* ^ ^^ ^p ^p. '^ 'P ^p Jp, *f ^p- *^ ^p ^P' ^P ^p ^P ^T* ^r* ^* *^ ^p ^\ ^* *^ /p /p ^p ^\ ^p. ^^ #^ j^i ^p ^p. ^^ /p ^^ ^p ^^ ^p #p ^^ ^fc f
f indnp( CH ! TH ? _np?Np3 ?Result?S?U?Ans? Level ?Rest> *-
is_a(H?pronoun) ?
Y is Level +1?
bui 1 d_subJ ( T ? C CH3 ? p 3 ?Ans 1 ? Y ?Rest ) ?
retract (af ter_verb( Y> ) ?
f indnp(Rest ? Cnp? CAnsl I Np33 ? Cnp? CAnsl ! Np33 ?S?U?Ans?Level ?Restl ) .
f indnp( CH ! T3 ? Cnp ? Np3 ?Result ?S?U?Ans ?Level ?Rest)
:-
not (sf ter_verb(Level ) ) ?
not( is_s(H?sdJ) ) ?
not(is_3(H?3dv) ) ?
not (is_3(H? verb?-) ) ?
not ( is_s(H?neg) ) ?
not(is_3(H?sux_verb?_) ) ?




not (3fter._verb (Level) ) ) ?





bui ld_subJ ( CH ! T3 ? CCResul t ! S3 ?U3?Ans?
Level?Rest).
/* If Code is
instantiated? the text h3S been processed.
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/* Resd another sentence before processing the text. */
clean_up(Code) ?
/* End the sentence with 3 terminal */
addterm(A?C. ! A3) .
/* Propositional-content functions as follows. Texts read
into this program are of the form "If X then Y. So
Z."
and
"D (declarative). So Z."? where X? Y? D? and Z are
placeholders for propositions. Prop-cont identifies
propositions 3nd their modslities (positive or nesstive)?
cstegorizes them as type X? Y? D? or Z? and asserts them
in the datab3se. The dst3 structure is "prop(Type? SubJ?
Pred? Tense?
Mod)."
Each clause in prop-cont attempts to match a syntactical
pattern in a sentence. Vari3tions on the text "If you study
then you will pass. So
study."








/# If you study then .... */
prop_cont(Cif !CCnp!CSubJ3 3! CVerb ! Rest333 ?More)
:-
is_3(Verb? verb?Tense) ?
bui 1 d_p red (Rest ? CVe rb3 ? then ?Pred ?More ) ?
update-db ( x ? SubJ ? P red ?Tense ? pos ) ?
prop_cont (Mo re?Morel ) ?
/* If you do not study then...
*/
prop_cont(Cif !CCnp! CSubJ3 3 ! CAux i CNeS ! CVerb i




bui ld-pred (Rest ?CVerb3?
then? Pred?More)?
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update-db ( x ? SubJ ? P red ?Tense ? neg ) ?
prop_cont(More?Morel ) ?
/% ... then you will pass. #/
prop_cont( Cther. ! C Cnp ! CSubJ3 3 ! CAux ! CVerb ! Rest 33 33 ?More) J-
is_s(Aux?3ux_verb? Tense) ?
is_3(Verb? verb?-) ?
build_pred(Rest?CVerb3? . ?Pred?More) ?
updste-db ( y ? SubJ ? Pred ?Tense ? pos ) ?
prop_cont(More?Morel) .
/% ... then you P3ssed. */
prop_cont( Cthen ! CCnp i CSubJ33 I CVerb ! CH i Rest3333 ?More) :-
not ( is_s(H?neg) ) ?
is_a( Verb? verb?Tense) ?
build_p red (Rest? CVerb 3 ? . ? Pred?More) ?
upd3te_db ( y ? SubJ ? Pred ? Tense ? pos ) ?
prop_cont (More?Morel > .
/* You will psss if ... */
prop_cont(CCr.p! CSubJ33 ! CAux ! CVerb ! Rest333 ?More)
X-
is_3(Aux?sux_verb?Tense) ?
is_s( Verb? verb?-) ?
build_pred(Rest?CVerb3?if ?Pred? Mo re) ?
check (More) ?
upd3te_db ( y ? SubJ ? Pred ? Tense ? pos ) ?
prop_cont ( More?Morel ) .
/* ... then you will not psss. */




is_s (Verb? verb ? _) ?
build_pred(Rest?CVerb3? ? ?Pred?More> ?
upd3te_db ( y ? SubJ ? Pred ?Tense ? neg ) ?
prop_cont (More?Morel > .
/# You will not P3ss if . ? . */
prop.-Cont( CCnp !CSubJ3 3! CAux !CNeS!
CVerb ! Rest33 33 ?More)
:-
is_s ( Aux ? aux-verb ?Tense ) ?
is3(Neg?neg) ?
bui ld_pred (Rest ? CVerb3? if
? Pred?More)?
check (More) ?
update-db ( y ? SubJ ? Pred ?Tense ?
neg ) ?
prop_cont (More?Morel ) .
/% You passed if ...
*/
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p rop_cont ( C Cnp ! CSubJ3 3 ! C Ve rb ! CH ! Res1 3 3 3 ?More > : -
not (is_3(H? verb?_) ) ?
is_s(Verb?verb?Tense) ?
bui ld_pred (Rest ?CVerb3? if ? Pred?More) ?
check (More) ?
updste_db(y ? SubJ? Pred? Tense? pos) ?
prop_cont (More?Morel ) .
/# You will psss. #/
prop-cont ( CCnp !CSubJ33! CAux! CVerb!Rest 33 3 ?More)
:-
i s_s ( Aux ? 3ux_verb ? Tense ) ?
is_s(Verb? verb?-) ?
build._pred(Rest?CVerb3? . ? Pred?More) ?
updste-db ( d ? SubJ ? Pred ?Tense ? pos ) ?
prop_cor.t(More?Morel) ?
/* You will not P3ss. */
prop_cont(CCnp!CSubJ3 3! CAux iCNeS! CVerb ! Rest3333 ?More)
is_s( Aux ?3ux_verb?Tense) ?
is_3(NeS?rieg> ?
is_s( Verb? verb?-) ?
bui ld_pred(Rest? CVerb 3? ? ?Pred?More) ?
upd3te_db ( d ? SubJ ? Pred ?Tense ? neg ) ?
prop_cont (More?Morel ) ?
/# You passed. */
prop_cor.t(CCr.p! CSubJ3 3 ! CVerb ! Rest 3 3 ? More)
:-
is_a(Verb? verb?Tense) ?
bui ldp red (Rest ?CVerb3? . ?Pred? More) ?
update_db(d?SubJ?Pred?Tense?pos> ?
prop_cont (Mo re?Morel ) .
/* Study your lesson. */
prop_cont ( CVerb ! Rest 3 ?More)
J-
is_a(Verb? verb?-) ?
bui ldp red (Rest? CVerb 3? ? ? Pred?More) ?
upd3tedb(z? Cyou3 ?Pred?f ?pos) ?
prop_cont (More?Morel ) .
/* So study your lesson. */
prop_cont(Cso! CVerb ! Rest33 ?More)
:-
is_s( Verb? verb?-) ?
build_pred(Rest?CVerb3? . ?Pred?More) ?
update_db(z?Cyou3?Pred?f ?pos) ?
prop_cont (More?Morel ) .
/% Do not study your
lesson */







build_pred(Rest?CVerb3? ? ?Pred?More) ?
update-db ( z ? Cyou3 ? Pred ? f ? neg ) ?
prop_cont(More?Morel) ?
/# So do not study your lesson */
prop_cont(Cso! CAux !CNes! CVerb ! Rest3333 ?More) X-
is_a( Aux ?aux_verb?-) ?
is_a(Neg?neg) ?
is_a(Verb? verb?-) ?
bui ld_pred(Rest ?CVerb3?* ? Pred?More) ?
updste_db(z?Cyou3?Pred?f ?neg) ?
propcont(More?Morel) ?
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^ "^^^ fl*^^^T^^^^^T^^^^^^^^^^^^ fl* ^h f
/% Build-predicste forms the predicste of 3 proposition
by building a list whose first member is the main verb.
The list is complete when the appropriate marker (e.g.?
if? then? .) is encountered. #/
/ O. t^ *Aj ^U
vL- tl/ -^/ t^ ^? lif ^y ^/ *Jv ^r ^1/ tl/ tt J/ ^^ llf J/ \^ J/ J#* \^ ^^ ^^ ^J/ ^/ vl/ Uu ^/ \i/ tj/ ^/ '^L' ^/ \1/ ^^ *J/ ^U ^S t||? ^^ "J/ iJ/ t^ \JLr ^L ^^ O^ tlj t^ vJy /
^r ^p ^p ^^ ^p ^p^ ^p /pV i^ ^p /p ^V /p ^p jp V^ ^p flt ^p ^^ /p ^p *^^ ^t^ ^p^ /p ^ fl\ /p y^\ /^ ^p /p /p ^p ^k ^p ^p ^p /^ rf\ ^p ^ ^\ Jf\ ^^ j^. /p ^^^^
build_pred( C3 ? Pred?Marker ? Pred? C3 ) ?
build-pred( CHead!Tail3?Pred?Marker?Pred? CHe3d ! Tail 3 )
:-
(Hesd ~~ Msrker?
Hesd -= ? ) .
build_pred(CHe3d ! T3il3 ?P?M3rker ? Pred?More)
:-
buildpred(T3il ? CHesd ! P3 ?Msrker? Pred?More) .
/% Speech-3ct identifies the msJor speech set being performed
by the speaker. Possibilities are promises? threats? sdvice?
and warnings. */





p rop (x ?_?_?-!'-)'
prop (y ?-?-?_ ?_) ?
prop (z?_?._?_?-)"
( p ro_or_adv (Code?Act ?Rel) ?
thr_or_war (Code?Act?Rel ) ?
59
other)




/* The text is of the form "D. So Z."? e.g.? "The stove is hot.
So don't touch it". Since the argument is an enthymeme?
try to generate the missing premise by searching the knowledge
base. If successful? call speech-set sssin. */
speech_3ct(Code?Act?Rel > :-
prop(d?SubJ?Pred?_?M)
prop(z?_ ?P?_?M1 ) ?
gen_prem( SubJ? Pred?M?P?M1 ) ?
speech_sct (Code?Act?Rel ) .
/* Not enough information to identify the major speech 3ct.
Go bsck snd resd snother sentence of the text. */
speech.act (Code?Act?Rel ) .
/ ^r, yl. ^U ^ ^ ^
j. ^J*
-^
J. ^U tT, -^ ^
yl. -A* ^ \|/ \f tl/ ^/ J/ ^ iXf -^ ^r ^ ylj \r \1j ilf \A/ tl/ %A/ vl/ \L. ds iXf tl# tl/ 4/ J#* *!/^ 4/ 4/ J/ ^f \Lf^ ^ 4/ W %|/ y
/ #^ /|t J^ ^p ^p ^p ^p ^p r^ /|V ^^
/p^
^^ ^ /|t ^^ /^ ^
jp^
^ ^^ ^p ^^ jp if. /p ^p ^ ^^ ^^ ^, ^ /p J^ J|(. /f. jf. (fi ^ ^i ^^ ^ ^. ^ ^ ^i ^^ ^. ^^ ^ ^ ^
/# Update-d3tsb3se asserts the proposition in the dat3b3se
as well as new entries for xpos snd xr.es lists if necessary. %/
t iS- ,1. ^. ^u ^i iAj
v|^ J/ O/ t|/ J/ tl/ t|/ ij/ tb ^U ^ ^ "Jy / J/ i^ \1/ J/ \b "X? ^ \L?U/ \b \L -^ iXf \J/
\L- \L-
-J/ \^ ^1/ ^/ ^/ "Jf -J/ J/ \^ ^ ^L/ n!/ \k -^^ J/ *Xf J/ /
/ ^p ^p ^p ^p ^^ ^p j^ ^p^ ^p ^p ^^ *p^ /p ^^ ^p ^p ^^ J^ ^t ^\ ^^ ^s ^p^ ^^^ jp^ ^^ ^. ^p *^ ^\ ^\ ^p /|\^ ^^ ^p ^p ^t /p ^V /p^ ^^ /p
/p^^^p ^p^ wY* /
update_db ( Type ? SubJ ? P red ? Tense ? M ) X -
rev (SubJ? SubJl ) ?
rev (Pred? CV 'Rest3) ?
asserts ( prop ( Type ?SubJl ? CV ! Rest3 ?Ter.se?M) ) ?
(xpos(CCV?pos3!_3)?
sssert3(xpos(CCV?pos3 3) > ) ?
(xneg(CCV?r.eg3!_3)?
3ssert3(xneg(CCV?r.eg33> ) > .
/*?**#****************************







/* X is a member of list Y.
Clocksin %. Mellish? pg. 45 */





/* Instantiate Code? Act and Rel(ation) */
code (Code ? Code?Act? Ac t?Rel?Rel) ?
/* Promise-or-advice uses heuristics 1? 2? and 4
-
outlined
in section 4.3 - to determine whether the msJor speech act is
promising or advising. Possible relations are 1 and 2.
(see section 4.2 for discussion of relations) */
/* Heuristics 1 _ 2 - XV is positive
- Relation 1 */
pro_or_3dv(Code?Act?Rel ) ?-
prop(x?S? CV ! _3 ?_?pos) ?
Prop(z?Sl?CVl!_3?_?N)?
xpos( CCV?pos3 ! Rest 3 ) ?














code(4?Code?3dvised?Act?l ?Rel ) ) .
/* Heuristics 1 - 2
- XV is neSstive
- Relation 1 */
pro_or_3dv(Code?Act?Rel>
?-
p rop ( x ? S ? C V ! _ 3 ? _ ? neg ) ?
prop(z?Sl?CVl !_3?_?N)?
xneg(CCV?r.eg3 !Rest3) ?






prop(y ?S2?_?f ?-> t
S2 Ci3?
code ( 1 ?Code ? promi sed




"^ " N ?
code ( 2 ?Code ?











member (CVI ?N3?Restl) ?
(S === Ci3?
T == f?
code ( 5 ?Code ? p romised ?Act ? 2 ?Rel ) ?
code(6?Code?3dvised?Act?2?Rel> ) .
/# Heuristic 4 - Rel3tior. 2 */






code (5? Code? promised?Act ?2?Rel ) ?
code(6?Code?3dvised?Act?2?Rel ) ) -
f ^b ^L/ !* tl/ i^ t^ lAf ^b O/ i^ ii* tl/ iA* \b ij/ yl/ 1^ tl/ U^ ^^ ^^ UL* t^ iA/ t^ ^L/ ^L^ ^/ ^L/ J^ d/ i^ vLp t^
^'
tA? tl/ \1/ tl/ tl/ ^/ ii* tl/ ^L/ tl* \b %,Lr tl/ tl/ '^ ^U ^/ tl/ \L* y
/ ^^ ^p ^p ^p ^p- ^p ^p ^p ^i ^^ /|\ ^flt ^^ /p ^t ^p *p ^p ^p /p ^^ ip ^p ^ ^ ^^ ^ ^^ ^t ^p^ ^p /p ^^ ^^ /p /p /p jp ^V /p ^\ ^ ^^ ^p ^^ *^ ^p ^^ ^^ ^^ ^t /p ^^/
/* Threst-or-w3rning uses heuristics 1? 2? snd 4
-
outlined in
section 4.3 - to determine whether the msJor speech set is
a threat or 3 wsmins. Possible relstions are 3 and 4
(see section 4.2 for discussion of relations) */
/?(Substitute backsl3sh for _ when running) */
/*###*#****************^
/* Heuristics 1 _ 2
- XV is positive
- Relation 3 */
















code (2? Code?warned?Act ?3?Rel) ?
prop(y?S2?_?f ?_) ,
S2 == Ci3?
code (3?Code? threatened?Act ?3?Rel) i
code(4?Code?warned?Act?3?Rel)).





xpos(CCV?pos3 ! Rest3) ?




prop(y ?S2?_?f ?_> ?
S2 == Ci3?




code(2?Code? wsrned?Act ?3?Rel ) ?
prop(a ?S2?_?f ?_) ?
S2 ===== Ci3?
code(3?Code? threstened?Act ?3?Rel ) ?
code(4?Code?W3rned?Act ?3?Rel ) )
/* Relstion 4 */
thr_orwar(Code?Act?Rel)
:-






code ( 5 ? Code ? thre3tened ?Act ? 4 ? Re 1 ) ?
code (6? Code?w3rr.ed?Act?4?Rel ) > .
/# Heuristic 4








code ( 5 ?Code ? threatened ?Act ?
4 ? Re 1 > ?




/* gen-prem Generates missing premises of prscticsl srguments
and asserts their propositional contents in the datsbsse.
Two examples below. #/
/*************************************
/* Hot things cause burns when touched. */
gen_prem(SubJ?Pred?pos?Ctouch!Rest3?N) :-
negate(N?Nl ) ?
member (hot? Pred) ?
3sse rta ( prop ( x ? C you3 ? C touch !Rest 3 ? f ? pos ) ) ?
assert3(prop(y?Cyou3?Cbe?burr.ed3?f ?N1) ) .
/* Excellent things are pleasing to see */
gen_p rem ( SubJ ? Pred ? pos ? C see ! Rest 3 ? N ) : -
(member(excellent?Pred) ?
member (good? Pred) ) ?
3sserts(prop(x?Cyou3?Csee!Rest3?f ?pos) ) ?
sssert3(prop(y?Cyou3? Cbe?plessed3 ?f ?N) ) .
/******************)|ok****^
/* Output generstes paraphrases of texts. */






J. ylj ifj iLf tlr t^
Jv ^b ^/ J/ i^ tl/^ iXf tt/ tl/ i^ >Xf tl/ ^ ^s OL/ )&f --A* t^ iX> iX* tl/ iAr -if t^ tl/ t^ tl/ ilv <Ap t^ tb tl/ ^ tl/ i* iX/
y'
* /P ^P ^t ^L Vp jp ^\ Jfi jp. ^^ /p ^^ /p /p jp /p /|\ /|. ^ jj\ /^ /p ^^ ,*p^ ^
jp^
^, ^. ^^ ^ ^ ^. ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^^ ^. ^ ^i ^ ^ ^ ^ ^, ^ ^ .^ Jf, ^
/# Is Code instantiated? If not? go back and read
another sentence. */
output (Code?Act ? Rel )
5-
var (Code) .
/# Promise or threat
- Heuristic 1 - relation 1 or 3 */
output (1 ?Act? Rel )
:-
nl ?
prop (x? SubJ? Pred ?Tense ?M) ?
prop (y? SubJ 1 ?Predl ?Tense 1 ?M1 ) ?
pn2 ( M ? U ) ?
pnl(Ml?V)?
make._sent(CCs3?CAct3?V? Cto3?Predi ? Cif 3 ?SubJ?U?Pred? C ? 33 ? C3 ?Respons
e) ?
write_sent (Response) ?r.l ?
conf irm(Rel ) ?
/* Advice or W3rning















conf irm( Rel) .
/* Promise or thre3t - Heuristic 2 - Relstior. 1 or 3 */















write_sent (Rl ) ?
write_sent (R2) ?
conf irm(Rel ) .
/* Advice or warning - Heuristic 2
- Rel3tion 1 or 3 */
output (4?Act ?Rel ) :-
nl ?










make-sent ( CCs3 ? CAct3?Cyou3?W?Cto3?CH!R3?C. 33 ?C3?RD?
mske-sent ( C C i f ? you3 ?U?P?Sl?Cwill3?V?Pl?C.33?C3?R2)?
m3ke_sent(CW?CH13?R?Cwill?m3ke?it3?Q?Clikely?th3t3?S3?Cwill3?T10?P




conf irm(Rel ) .
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make-sent ( CCs3 ? CAct3 ?V?Cto3 ? CH! R3? Cif 3 ?S3?U?P?C. 33 ?C3?RD?




conf irm(Rel ) .
/* Advice or warning - Relation 2 or 4 */















?hss3 ? CAct3 ? Cyou3 ? W? Cto3 ?P2? C . 33 ?
C3?R2)?
write_sent (Rl ) ?
write_sent (R2) ?
conf irm(Rel > .
/****************************************^
/* Make-sent changes s list of lists (e.g. CCs?s3 ?Cb?b3 ?Cc33 )







make_sent (Rest?Ll ?List) ?
/******************>m***^^
/* Append(X?Y?Z) appends list Y to list X to form list Z.
Clocksin & Mellish? pgs. 55-56* */
/******3tok*****#**#*#**>|(*^^
append ( C3 ?L?L) ?
apper.d(CX!L13?L2?CX!L33) :-
3PPer.d(Ll?L2?L3) .
/ ^L* ^U \^
yjj ijj tL* -JU v^
yjj U^ -J/ vly iXr ij/ 'A' \l/ tb \t ^ tl/ tb^ tb t^ vO tl/ tb \l/ iif tl/ ij/ \1* tl/%!/ iju \L? tl/ tl/ tl/ i^ lAr d/ tk -^ ^/ iAf J/ J/ iXf J/ -^^ lAr ^* /
zf ^ /fr /p^ ^V ^H /p^^^^ /^ f^ T%^^^^^^ ,*p^ ^^^ Jp Jp /Jk^^^^ ^V^ Jp^^^^^^^^^^^
* * * **^^
*
/
/* Confirm 3sks the user whether the paraphrase is accurate.
If it is? new information is 3sserted in the dstsbsse. If not?
the user is Queried. */
/ ij* iA/
-jj <*A*
y^ ^X* \Xf ^L/ O^ ij/ Jj iL* tl/ O/ iAr i^ ^X* vl/ "A* \^ tk ^J/ \I/ iJ/ tA# iX/ t^ Q/ iX* J> \^ iX? ^^ iJ/ iX tl/ iX* ^/ ^L/ ^/ ^Ly t^ ^^ t^
iA*^L ^/ ^r ^/ "At ^L/ ^L/ ^Lr *^ /








(Q == Cyes? .3 ?
new_facts(Rel ) ?
menu( 1 ) ) ?





/* Combine(X?Y?Z) combines atoms X 3nd Y to form stom Z.














/* New-facts updates the
benefit snd hsrm lists when s
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paraphrase has been confirmed by the user. */
/********************************^








(benefit ( CCV1 ?M13 !Restl3 ) ?
ssserts(benefit(CCVl?M133>))?
(benef it(CCV2?M23 !Rest23 > ?
3Ssert3(benefit(CCV2?M233>)).
/# Promise or sdvice - Relation 2 #/
new_facts(2)
:-








ssserta (benef it (CCV?M33)))
/* Threat or W3rnir.g











( hsrm ( C CV2 ? M33 ! Rest23 ) ?
sssert3(hsrm(CCV2?M333))).
/# Threst or warning














/* Menu Queries the user for additional information when
the program (1) h3s inaccurstely par3Phrssed s text or
(2) hss beer, unable to paraphrase at all. Information
elicited is recorded in the datsbsse and a new paraphrase
is attempted. */
/*************************************^
/* If Y is in the hearer's interests? update the benefit lists
and goto mer.u(2). If Y is not in the hearer's interests?
update the harm lists 3r.d goto menu(3). Otherwise? sdvise
the user th3t the text is beyond the scope of the proSram. */
menu(l)
?-
nl ?write( 'Let Y be the stste of affairs described in the
conseouent of the premise. ') ?r.l ?
write( 'Which of the following most accurately describes the
viewpoint of the
speaker?'
) ?nl ?nl ?
write('A. Y is in the interests of the hearer .') ?r.l ?
write('B. Y is not in the interests of the hearer .') ?nl ?
write('C. Y does not sffect the interests of the hearer one
way or the other .') ?nl ?nl ?
prop(y?_?CV!Rest3?_?M)?
read-in (Q?R) ?






3Sserts(harm(CCV?M33) ) ) ?
menu (3) ?
bad-text) .
/# Promise or 3dvise
- Heuristic 3.
Ask whether the relation is 2? 1? or 5. If 2? update the
benefit list. If 1? update the xpos and xneg lists. In either
case? invoke promise-or-advise. If 5? advise the user thst









write( 'premise 3nd Z the
3ction specified in the conclusion.
'
) ?
write( 'Which of the following
most sccurately describes the
write( 'viewpoint of the
speaker?'
) ?r.l ?r.l ?
write('A. The hearer should do Z
in anticipation of Y.')?nl?









(Q == Ca? .3?
(benefit(CCVl?M13!Rest3) ?
member (CV2?M23?Rest)?







member ( CV2?M23 ? CCV?pos3 ! Rest3 ) ?
bsd_text ?
(M == pos?
retrsct(xpos(CCV?Pos3 !Rest3) ) ?
3Sserts(xpos( CCV?pos3 ! CCV2?M23 ! Rest 33 ) ) ?
negste(M2?N2) ?
retract ( xneg ( C C V ? neg3 ! Rest23 ) ) ?
asserts(xneg(CCV?neg3 ! CCV2?N23 ! Rest233 > > ?
ret r3ct( xneg (CCV?neg3 !Rest3) ) ?
asserts ( xneg ( CCV?r.eg3 ! CCV2?M23 ! Rest 3 3 ) ) ?
negate(M2?N2) ?
retr3ct(xpos(CCV?Pos3!Rest23) ) ?
3Ssert3(xpos(CCV?POs3 ! CCV2?N23 ! Rest233 ) )) ?
pro_or_sdv(Codel?Actl ?Rell) ?
outPut(Codel ?Actl ?Rell ) ?
cle3n_up(Codel ) ) ?
bsd_text ) *
/* Threat or warning - Heuristic 3*
Ask whether the relation is 4? 3? or 5. If 4? update the
harm list* If 3? update the xpos snd xneg lists* In either
esse? invoke threst-or-wsrning* If 5? sdvise the user th3t
the text is beyond the scope of the prosrsm */
menu (3) ? -
nl ?




write( 'premise 3r.d Z the sction specified in the conclusion.
')?
write( 'Which of the following most sccur3tely describes the
')?
write( 'viewpoint of the
spesker?'
) ?nl ?nl ?
write('A. The hesrer should do Z in snticipstion of Y.')?nl?
write('B. By doing Z the hesrer would decresse the
likelihood of X.')?nl?
write('C* Neither of the sbove.
'
) ?nl ?nl ?






















ssserts(xpos(CCV?Pos3 ! CCV2?N23 ! Rest233 ) ) ?
retrsct(xpos(CCV?pos3 !Rest3) ) ?
ssserts(xpos(CCV?pos3 ! CCV2?M23 ! Rest33 ) ) ?
neg3te(M2?N2) ?
retract(xneg(CCV?neg3 !Rest23) > ?
asserts (xneg ( CCV?neg3 ! CCV2?N23 ! Rest233) ) ) ?
thr_or_wsr(Codel ?Actl ?Rell) ?
output(Codel?Actl?Rell) ?
clean_up(Codel ) > ?
bad-text) ?
/ f _ _f _^ ^ 4 _f _^ _^ _f _f _ f _ ^ _ ^ - 1 _f _f _tf _ t _ ^ _fT _ f _ f '_f _f *_fW _^ _ ^ _< _f _f *4f _^ _ ' Sir* _f _f /
/f /p^>p/p4*^^"^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^/i*/r^"^^^^^^'^^^^^^^^^^^^^^-T^p^^J^^/
/# Bad-text informs the user thst the text is beyond the
scope of the progrsm snd retrscts sll propositions #/
/ ytt j, UL/ tl/ tb *J/ Xr t^ J/ J/ ^Xr iX? J/ t^ J/ ^r \t* vl/ J/
>A* ^/ ^ ^ J/
'A-
^ ^ ^ '^
*A* \l/ \^
4/ J/ tO tO il/ ^f ^L* t^ ^U \l/ ^ tAf tl/ "Xf \b^ -^ J/ *^ \b J/ ^/ /
bsd_text :-
nl?




write( 'types of speech acts
-
promises? threats? 3dvice? snd
')?








/% Positive-or-negative sssigns the
empty list or 3 neS3tive
to the second srgument* These








/* Quantity assigns "more" or "less" to the second argument*
These clauses are invoked by output. */
Quantity(promised?Cmore3) ?










is_3 (let? verb ?pr) .
is_3(fail ? verb?pr) .
is_a ( think ? verb? pr) *
is_s( relax? verb? pr) .
is_a(give? verb?pr ) *
is_3 ( ground ? verb? pr) ?
is_s(be? verb?pr) ?
is_s(overstudy? verb?pr) .
is_a (hit? verb ?pr) .
is_a(smoke? verb?pr) *








is_3( resign? verb? pr) ?
is_a ( start? verb? pr) ?
is_a( insist? verb ?pr) ?




is_a(fall ? verb ?pr ) .
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is_s(sell ?verb?pr) ?
is_3 (wait? verb ?pr) ?
is_a( is? verb?pr ) ?
is_3 (touch? verb ?pr)
is_3 ( see ? verb? pr) .
is_3(wor? verb?P3st ) *
is_a(have? verb? pr) .
is_a(studied?verb?past) .
is_s(feel ?verb?pr ) ?
is_3(enJoy ? verb?pr) .
/* Auxilisry Verbs */























is_a( ? ? term ) ?
is_s(??term) .
is_s ( ! ? term) ?
/* Connectives */
is_a(if ?conn) .









INPUT IS OF THE FORM "IF X THEN Y. SO DO Z. HEURISTIC 1 IS
EMPLOYED FOR UTTERANCES IN WHICH X = Z OR X = -Z? WHERE
"=="
IS TO




searle2 consulted 33004 bytes 7*449997 sec.
yes
! ?- talk.
HEURISTIC 1 ~ PROMISES
:: If you finish your homework then I will let you watch
television. So finish thst msth.
S promised to let you wstch television if you finish your
homework.
Is this correct?
!: I will give you five dollsrs if you do not fsil your exam. So
do not fail.






!: I will ground you for a
week if you fail the test tomorrow. So
do not fail.
S threatened to ground




' "iU "0t let UOU U3tch t.li.ion if
"^ tD l6t UOU Uatch fusion if do not
Is this correct?
! : yes.
HEURISTIC 1 - ADVISE
i: If you study for the exam then you will Pass. So study hard.




.': If you do not smoke then you will be healthier. So do not
smoke*
S advised you not to smoke since if you do not smoke you will be
healthier.
Is this correct?
! : You will feel better if you do not smoke* So do not smoke
cheap cigars.
S sdvised you not to smoke chesp cigsrs since if you do not smoke




! : Do not overstudy for the test. You will be too tired to t3ke
the exam if you overstudy.
S warned you not to overstudy for the test since if you overstudy




i: If you do not study at sll then you will fail. So study 3t
least an hour.
S warned you to study 3t least an hour since if you do not study
at all you will fail*
Is this correct?
THE FOLLOWING CASES STRIKE ONE AS ODD SINCE THEY CLASH WITH
CONVENTIONAL VALUES. THE PARAPHRASES CAPTURE THE ODDNESS AND TO
SOME EXTENT EXPLAIN IT.
', X If you finish your homework then I will ground you for the
weekend* So finish your homework.





{ If you P3ss your exsm then I will give you five dollsrs. So do
not pass your exam.
S threatened to give you five dollars if you pass your exsm.
Is this correct?
i: If you study for the test then you
will psss for sure. So do
not study for even fifteen minutes*
S wsrned you not to study
for even fifteen minutes since if you




IN THE NEXT THREE EXAMPLES? THE SPEECH ACTS IN QUESTION ARE
BEYOND THE SCOPE OF THIS PROGRAM. THE ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE IS THAT
OF REQUEST IN THE FIRST TWO EXAMPLES AND MORAL APPEAL IN THE
THIRD* NOTE THAT THE ACCURACY OF A PARAPHRASE DEPENDS ON THE
CONTEXT OF THE UTTERANCE* ONE CAN EASILY IMAGINE CONTEXTS IN
WHICH THE PROGRAM'S PARAPHRASES WOULD BE RIGHT ON TARGET*
i: Help me with this stuff. I will pass the test if you help.
S promised to pass the test if you help.
Is this correct?
Let Y be the state of affairs described in the conseauent of the
premise*
Which of the following most 3ccur3tely describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A* Y is in the interests of the hearer.
B. Y is not in the interests of the hearer.
C* Y does not affect the interests of the hearer one way or the
other.
. C .
In addition to assertions? this program recognizes only four
types of speech acts - promises? threats? advice? and warnings.
The text falls under none of these categories.
!: Help me with this m3terisl. I will f3il the test if you do not
help.
S threatened to f3il the test if you do not help.
Is this correct?
! : no.
Let Y be the state of sffsirs described in the conseauent of the
premise.
Which of the following most sccurstely
describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A* Y is in the interests of
the hearer*
B* Y is not in the interests
of the hearer.
C* Y does not affect the




assertions? this program recognizes only four
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types of speech acts - promises? threats? advice? snd W3rnir.gs*
The text falls under none of these categories.
!: If you give to the relief fund then you will save African
lives* So give generously*
S advised you to give generously since if you give to the relief
fund you will save africsn lives.
Is this correct?
Let Y be the st3te of sffsirs described in the conseauent of the
premise.
Which of the following most sccurstely describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A. Y is in the interests of the hearer.
B. Y is not in the interests of the hearer.




In addition to assertions? this program recognizes only four
types of speech acts - promises? threats? advice? and warnings.





6.2 HEURISTICS 2 AND 3
HEURISTIC 2 IS EMPLOYED FOR ARGUMENTS IN WHICH Z (THE ACTION
MENTIONED IN THE CONCLUSION) WOULD? IF PERFORMED? EITHER INCREASE
OR DFCREASE THE LIKELIHOOD OF X (THE EVENT
MENTIONED IN THE
ANTECEDENT OF THE PREMISE). TO PROCESS SUCH CASES? THE PROGRAM
MUST FIRST BE TAUGHT THE APPROPRIATE










HEURISTIC 2 - PROMISES
IN THIS CASE? THE PROGRAM FIRST HAS TO BE TAUGHT THE RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN STARTING AND FINISHING A PROJECT.
i: Start on your math right away. I will let you watch television
tonight if you finish all your homework before six.
USING HEURISTIC 3 THE PROGRAM NOW NARROWS THE POSSIBILITIES.
Let Y be the state of affsirs described in the conseauent of the
premise*
Which of the following most accurately describes the viewpoint of
the speakerp?
A* Y is in the interests of the hearer*
B. Y is not in the interests of the hearer.
C* Y does not affect the interests of the hearer one way or the
other.
! : A*
THE RELATION IS EITHER 2? 1? OR 5 - BUT WHICH ONE?
Let X be the state of affairs described in the antecedent of the
premise and Z the action specified in the conclusion* Which of
the following most sccurstely describes the viewpoint of the
speaker?
A. The hearer should do Z in anticipation of Y.
B. By doing Z the hearer would increase the likelihood of X.
C* Neither of the above*
! : B.
S promised to let you watch television tonight if you finish sll
your homework before six.
St3rtir.g on your msth right away will make it more likely th3t




THE PROGRAM NOW KNOWS WHAT IT
NEEDS TO KNOW IN ORDER TO
PARAPHRASE SIMILAR CASES.
i: Start your essaa. I
will let you go to the show tonight if you
finish your homework this
afternoon*
S promised to let you
go to the show tonight if you finish your
homework this afternoon* .
Starting your essay will
make it more likely that you will finish
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your homework this afternoon*
Is this correct?
! : yes*
i: If you finish your homework before six then they will give you
more work to do. So do not start until five forty five.
S warned you not to start until five forty five.
If you finish your homework before six they will give you more
work to do.
Not starting until five forty five will make it less likely that
you will finish your homework before six.
Is this correct?
!? If you do not finish studying for the test then you will f3il
for sure. So stsrt studying ss soon ss possible.
S warned you to start studying as soon as possible.
If you do not finish studying for the test you will fail for
sure .
Starting studying 3S soon ss possible will make it less likely
that you will not finish studying for the test.
Is this correct?
i : Do not stsrt your homework until nine. If you do not finish
before nine thirty then they will help you do it.
S sdvised you not to stsrt your homework until nine.
If you do not finish before nine thirty they will help you do it.
Not stsrt ins your homework until nine will make it more likely
that you will not finish before nine thirty.
Is this correct?
' *
If you do not finish
your homework then I will discontinue
your sllowance. So stsrt
right now.
S threstened to
discontinue your sllow3r.ce if you do not finish
your homework.
Starting right now will









HEURISTIC 2 - THREATS
IN THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE? THE PROGRAM FIRST LEARNS THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HITTING PEOPLE AND BEING NEAR THEM.
! : I will not let you watch television tonight if you hit your
sister. So do not go near her.
USING HEURISTIC 3? THE PROGRAM NARROWS THE POSSIBILITIES
Let Y be the state of 3ff3irs described in the conseauent of the
premise*
Which of the following most sccurstely describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A. Y is in the interests of the hearer.
B Y is not in the interests of the hearer.
C* Y does not affect the interests of the hearer one way or the
other.
i * B ?
THE RELATION IS 4? 3? OR 5. BUT WHICH ONE?
Let X be the state of affsirs described in the antecedent of the
premise and Z the action specified in the conclusion* Which of
the following most sccurstely describes the viewpoint of the
speaker?
A* The hearer should do Z in anticipstion of Y*
B* By doing Z the hearer would decrease the likelihood of X.
C* Neither of the above.
B ?
S threatened not to let
you watch television tonight if you hit
your sister*
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Not going near her will make it less likely th3t you will hit
your sister.
Is this correct?
THE PROGRAM NOW KNOWS WHAT IT NEEDS TO KNOW IN ORDER TO
PARAPHRASE SIMILAR CASES.
!* I will not let you watch television tonight if you hit your
sister. So do not go near her.
S threatened not to let you watch television tonight if you hit
your sister.





!: I will let you watch television tonight if you do not hit your
sister. So do not go near her.
S promised to let you watch television tonight if you do not hit
your sister.




: If you do not hit your brother then
he will not hit you back.
So do not go near him for the rest
of the day.
S advised you not to go near
him for the rest of the day.
If you do not hit your brother
he will not hit you back.
Not going near him for the
rest of the day will make it mo





i: If you hit your
brother then he will hit you back. So do not
go near him.
S warned you not to
go near him.
If you hit your
brother he will hit you back.
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i: If you do not hit your brother then he will think thst you are
ignoring him. So go near him.
S warned you to go near him.
If you do not hit your brother he will think that you are
ignoring him.
Going near him will make it less likely that you will not hit
your brother.
Is this correct?
! : If you hit your bother then he will not hit you back. So go
near him.
S advised you to go near him.
If you hit your bother he will not hit you back.
Going near him will make it more likely thst you will hit your
bother.
Is this correct?
HEURISTIC 2 ~ ADVICE
IN THIS SEQUENCE? THE PROGRAM IS TAUGHT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN






32904 bytes 6.883331 sec.
yes
! ?- talk*
! : If you pass your exams
then your mother will buy you 3 stereo.
So study hard.
Let Y be the state of
aff3irs described in the conseauent of the
premise*
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Which of the following most accuratela describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A* Y is in the interests of the hearer.
B. Y is not in the interests of the hearer.
C* Y does not affect the interests of the hearer one way or the
other*
Let X be the state of affairs described in the antecedent of the
premise 3nd Z the sction specified in the conclusion. Which of
the following most sccurstely describes the viewpoint of the
speaker?
A. The hearer should do Z in anticipation of Y.
B. By doing Z the hearer would increase the likelihood of X.
C. Neither of the above.
. B
S sdvised you to study hsrd.
If you P3ss your exams your mother will buy you a stereo.
Studying hard will make it more likely th3t you will pass your
exams*
Is this correct?
THE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN LEARNED. SIMILAR CASES CAN NOW BE
PROCESSED.
i : Study hard. If you P3ss your exams then your mother will buy
you a stereo*
S advised you to study hard.
If you pass your exams your mother will buy you 3 stereo.
Studying hsrd will make it more likely that you will psss your
exams.
Is this correct?
i: I will buy you a bright
new yoyo if you pass at least one of
your tests. So study up*
S promised to buy you a
bright new yoyo if you psss 3t lesst one
of your tests*
Studying up will make it more






i: If you do not Pass your exams then I will ground you for the
weekend. So study as much as you C3n.
S threatened to ground you for the weekend if you do not pass
your exams.
Studying as much as you can will make it less likely that you
will not pass your exams*
Is this correct?
!: If you do not pass your tests then your mother will take
unspecified action aSsinst you. So study very hsrd for those
exams.
S warned you to study very hard for those exams.
If you do not pass your tests your mother will take unspecified
action against you.
Studying very hard for those exams will make it less likely that
you will not pass your tests.
Is this correct?
! : If you pass sll your tests then your mother will ground you
for the weekend. So do not study at all.
S warned you not to study at all*
If you P3SS sll your tests your mother will ground you for the
weekend*








IN THIS SEQUFNCE? THE
PROGRAM LEARNS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
TAKING BETTER CARE OF SOMEONE





searle2 consulted 32856 bytes 6*916664 sec*
yes
! ?- talk.
IX If you do not take better care of your sister then she will
insist on having a babysitter while we are gone. So chsnge your
attitude*
Let Y be the state of 3ff3irs described in the conseauent of the
premise*
Which of the following most sccurstely describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A* Y is in the interests of the hearer.
B. Y is not in the interests of the hearer.
C. Y does not affect the interests of the hearer one way or the
other.
Let X be the state of affairs described in the antecedent of the
premise and Z the action specified in the conclusion. Which of
the following most sccurstely describes the viewpoint of the
speaker?
A. The hearer should do Z in anticipation of Y.
B. By doing Z the hearer would decrease the likelihood of X.
C Neither of the above.
S wsrned you to change your attitude.
If you do not take better care of your sister she will insist on
having a babysitter while we are gone.
Changing your attitude will make it less likely that you will not
take better care of your sister.
Is this correct?
THE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN
LEARNED.
i: Change your ways. She
will insist on a babysitter if you do
not take better care of
her.
S warned you to change
your ways.
If you do not take better






Changing your ways will make
it less likely that you will not
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take better care of her.
Is this correct?
! ? yes*
j: If you t3ke better care of your sister then she will not
insist on having a babysitter. So change your sttitude.
S sdvised you to chsr.se your sttitude.
If you tske better care of your sister she will not insist on
having a babysitter.
Changing your attitude will make it more likely that you will
take better care of your sister.
Is this correct?
! : yes.
!: I will discontinue your allow3nce if you do not tske better
care of your brother. So chsnSe your attitude.
S threatened to discontinue your sllowsnce if you do not t3ke
better care of your brother.
Changing your attitude will make it less likely thst you will not
tske better care of your brother.
Is this correct?
!: I will give you five dollsrs if you tske good care of your
brothers while I am awaa. So ch3nge your 3ttitude.
S promised to give you five dollars if
you tske good care of your
brothers while i am swsy.
Changing your attitude will make it more likely that you will
t3ke good care of your brothers





I will give you five
dollars if you take care of your sister
for the rest of the
day* So change your surly ways*
S Promised to give
you five dollsrs if you tske care of you




Changing your surly ways
will make it more likely that you will
take care of your




!J I will give you five dollsrs if you do not tske better care of
your pets* So do not change your attitude*
S promised to give you five dollars if you do not take better
care of your pets*
Not changing your attitude will make it more likely that you will
not take better C3re of your pets.
Is this correct?
IN THE FOLLOWING SEQUENCE? S BELIEVES THAT IT IS POSSIBLE THAT X
AND THAT IF X THEN Y. THE HEARER IS URGED TO DO Z IN ANTICIPATION
OF Y. TO PARAPHRASE SUCH CASES? THE PROGRAM MUST FIRST LEARN THE
APPROPRIATE RELATION BETWEEN Y AND Z*
PROMISES
! : Choose what kind of stereo you want* If you psss 3ll your
exams then I will buy you a stereo*
Let Y be the state of affsirs described in the conseauent of the
premise*
Which of the following most sccurstely describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A. Y is in the interests of the hearer.
B. Y is not in the interests of the
hearer.
C. Y does not 3ffect the interests of the
hearer one way or the
other.
! : A.
Let X be the state of
affairs described in the antecedent of the
premise and Z the action
specified in the conclusion. Which of
the following most
sccurstely describes the viewpoint of the
speaker?
A* The hearer should
do Z in anticipation of Y*
B* By doing Z the
hearer would increase the likelihood of X*
C* Neither of the
above.
! : A.
S promised to buy
you a stereo if you pass all your exams.
89




i: I will buy you a box if you pass your courses. Choose what
kind you want.
S promised to buy you a box if you pass your courses.





! : If you psss your test then your uncle will buy you 3 bike.
Choose a bright shiny one.
S believes that if you pass your test your uncle will buy you 3
bike.




! : If you do not psss your exams then I will ground you. So do
not make any plans for the weekend.
Let Y be the state of affsirs
described in the conseauent of the
premise.
Which of the following most
accurstely describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A. Y is in the interests
of the hearer.
B. Y is not in the
interests of the hearer.
C. Y does not affect
the interests of the hearer one way or the
other.
. B
Let X be the state of
affairs described in the antecedent of the
Premise and "z the action specified in the conclusion. Which of
the following most
accurately describes the viewpoint of the
speaker?
90
A. The hearer should do Z in ar.ticiP3tion of Y.
B. By doing Z the hearer would decrease the likelihood of X.
C. Neither of the above*
! : A*
S threatened to ground you if you do not Pass your exams.
For this reason S has suggested that you not make any plans for
the weekend.
Is this correct?
! : If you do not pass your year then I will ground you
indefinitely. So do not make any plans for the next six weeks or
so*
S threatened to ground you indefinitely if you do not psss your
year.
For this reason S has suggested that you not make any plans for
the next six weeks or so.
Is this correct?
WARNING
! Your mother will ground you forever if you do not pass the
Quiz tomorrow. So do not make any plans until you reach
adulthood.
S believes th3t if you do not psss the Quiz tomorrow your mother
will ground you forever.
With this in mind S h3s warned you not to make ana plans until
you reach adulthood*
Is this correct?
FALLING PRICES CAN BE AN ADVANTAGE OR A DISADVANTAGE DEPENDING ON
ONE'S CIRCUMSTANCES* IN THE NEXT
SEQUENCE? BOTH CASES ARE
ILLUSTRATED*
IX If the college closes
then real est3te prices will fall* So
sell your house as soon
as you can*
Let Y be the state of
affairs described in the conseauent of the
premise*
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Which of the following most accurately describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A* Y is in the interests of the hearer*
B* Y is not in the interests of the hearer.




Let X be the state of aff3irs described in the sntecedent of the
premise snd Z the action specified in the conclusion* Which of
the following most accurately describes the viewpoint of the
speaker?
A. The hearer should do Z in anticipation of Y*
B. By doing Z the hearer would decrease the likelihood of X*
C* Neither of the above*
! : A*
S believes that if the college closes real estate prices will
fall.
With this in mind S hss wsrned you to sell your house ss soon ss
you can*
Is this correct?
!: Re3l estate prices will fsll if the college closes* Sell your
property Quick.
S believes th3t if the college closes re3l estste prices will
fsll.




Real estate prices will
fall if the college closes. Wait a
year before buying a
house in the ares.
Let Y be the stste of
sffsirs described in the conseauent of the
Sh_chSof the following most accurately describes the viewpoint of
the speaker?
A Y is in the
interests of the hearer.
B Y is not in the
interests of the hearer.
Y does not affect
the interests of the hearer one way or the
other*
: a.
Let X be the state of 3ffsirs described in the sntecedent of the
premise and Z the action specified in the conclusion. Which of
the following most accurstely describes the viewpoint of the
speaker?
A. The hearer should do Z in anticipation of Y.
B. By doing Z the hearer would increase the likelihood of X.
C. Neither of the above.
! : A.
S believes th3t if the college closes resl estste prices will
fsll.
With this in mind S hss sdvised you to wsit s aear before buying
s house in the area.
Is this correct?
!? Real estate prices will fsll if the college closes. W3it 3
aear before buying.
S believes that if the college closes real estate prices will
fall.
With this in mind S has advised you to wsit s aear before buying.
Is this correct?
6.3 HEURISTIC 4
FOR UTTERANCES IN WHICH
HEURISTIC 4 PLAYS A ROLE? (1) THE EVENT
SPECIFIED BY X IS IN THE PAST AND
(2) THE EVENT SPECIFIED BY Y IS
KNOWN TO BE EITHER
ADVANTAGEOUS OR DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE HEARER.
WITH THIS INFORMATION?
THE PROGRAM MAKES THE APPROPRIATE
DEDUCTIONS.
TM THF FOLLOWING
SEQUENCE? THE FIRST FOUR TEXTS ARE USED TO
fwrriRM THE PROGRAM THAT PASSING TESTS AND BEING GIVEN MONEY ARE
IN THE HEARER'S






searle2 consulted 33004 bytes 7*399998 sec.
yes
! ?- talk.
i ? If you study for the test then you will pass. So study.





!: If you do not study then you will fail. So study for the test.
S warned you to study for the test since if you do not study you
will fail*
Is this correct?
!: If you study for the test then
I will give you five dollars.
So study.
S promised to give you five
dollsrs if you study for the test.
Is this correct?
i: If you do not
study then I will ground you for the
weekend.
! : So study.
S threstened to
ground you for the weekend





NOW MAKE USE OF





test then you will psss. So relax.
S believes
that if you
studied for the test you will psss.
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\X Resign yourself to the inevitsble* If you did not study for
the test then you will fail.
th3t if yU did not ^tudu for the tes* ou will fail.
With this m mind S has warned you to resign yourself to the
inevitable.
Is this correct?
i: If you studied for the test then I will give you five dollars.
So start celebr3tins.
S promised to give you five dollsrs if you studied for the test.
For this reason S has suggested that you start celebrating.
Is this correct?
! : If you did not study for the test then I will ground you
indefinitely. Give that a thought or two.
S threatened to ground you indefinitely if you did not study for
the test*
For this reason S has suggested th3t you give thst s thought or
two*
Is this correct?






IN ATTEMPTING TO PARAPHRASE? THE PROGRAM FINDS THAT
IT MUST FIRST
GENERATE HIDDEN PREMISES.
'? The stove is hot. So do not touch the stove.
S warned you not to touch the stove since if you touch the stove





!: It is hot* Do not touch it.
S warned you not to touch it since if you touch it you will be
burned.
Is this correct?
! : Touch it. It is not very hot.





! : See the exhibition* It is excellent.
S 3dvised you to see the exhibition since if you see the




;: Do not see the movie. It is not very good.
S warned you not to see the movie since if you see the movie you
will not be pleased.
Is this correct?
The production is? I would
say? somewhat less than excellent. Do
not see it.
S warned you not to see






INTERRUPTIONS IN THE DIALOGUE -









If you study then you will P3ss. The Roysls won the pennant
last aear. So study for 3t least two hours.
S advised you to study for at least two hours since if you study
you will P3ss.
Is this correct?
! The Royals won the pennant last year. If you finish your
homework then I will let you fool around this 3fternoon. The
Ysnkees won the aear before. So finish up.





IN THE FOLLOWING CASE THE PROGRAM WAS
INITIALLY MISLED BY THE
FIRST TWO SENTENCES AND TRIED TO
GENERATE A MISSING PREMISE.
THIS IS INTERESTING BECAUSE HUMANS ARE
OFTEN GARDEN-PATHED UNDER
THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES.
!: The Royals won the
pennant. Study for the test* If you study
then you will pass*
S advised you to study
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